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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis provides a critique of the current tests for employment status contained at s.230 
of the Employment Rights Act 1996 and proposes an alternative test. The particular focus 
of the critique is upon the failure of the current tests to adapt to new working relationships 
arising in sections of the gig economy. Recent case law in relation to status is considered 
along with a historical analysis of the development of employment law into a separate 
sphere of statutory regulation. This thesis argues that the main failings of the status tests 
arise in consequence of the requirement for workers to establish a contractual nexus. An 
alternative test is proposed which removes the contractual nexus altogether and creates a 
single-tier employment status. Consequential amendments to the definition of dismissal at 
s.95 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 are proposed with the aim of providing all 
employees with end-of-employment rights. 
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CHAPTER 1 
1.1: GETTING THE GIG 
 
The Communist Manifesto was published by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in February 
1848.
1
 It was the first time Marx had set out his theories on both the means of production 
and how ownership of these means enabled the bourgeoisie to extract surplus value from 
the labour of their workers. Since then, “seize the means of production” has become a 
rallying call of the far left. 
 
The manifesto was written in the period following the first industrial revolution. One 
hundred and seventy years later however a strange and different kind of revolution is 
underway. The means of production are not being seized by the workers, but are in fact 
being given over to them freely by the capitalists themselves. “Uber, the world’s largest 
taxi company, owns no vehicles. Facebook, the world’s most popular media owner, creates 
no content […] and Airbnb, the world’s largest accommodation provider, owns no real 
estate”.2 Instead of owning the means of production, the new bourgeoisie seek to dominate 
the customer interface and generate their income either by taxing transactions conducted at 
these interfaces (as in the case of Uber) or by selling advertising space at the interface (as 
in the case of Facebook). The speed with which these companies have come to dominate 
their respective markets is based to a large extent on their ability to exploit the ubiquity of 
smartphone technology. These aggressive new business models have allowed businesses to 
strip out the costlier features of the more traditional, capital-owning businesses. 
 
One particular overhead these businesses models have been able to streamline is the cost of 
labour. Smartphones have allowed work in certain industries to be allocated on an on 
demand basis, making labour costs ultra-sensitive to fluctuations in demand. This change 
has created new ways of working which, in turn, have led to confusion as to the exact 
nature of the legal relationships which are being formed between companies and 
individuals who agree to provide labour on their behalf. Testament to this uncertainty is the 
volume of cases currently ascending the appellate ladder in the UK. 
 
                                                 
1
 Marx/Engels Selected Works, Vol. One, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1969, p. 98-137; 
2
 Goodwin, Tom, The battle is For the Customer Interface, https://techcrunch.com/2015/03/03/in-the-age-of-
disintermediation-the-battle-is-all-for-the-customer-interface/, 2015 
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The aim of this thesis is not only to explain and explore the current test for employee 
status, but also to propose an alternative test designed to give more certainty to workers 
and businesses alike. Part of this analysis will focus on attempts which have already been 
made by both the Supreme Court
3
 and the Government
4
 to solve the problem of 
employment status. I will argue that these attempts have been inadequate insofar as they 
have been unable or unwilling to remove the fundamental and insoluble paradox at the 
heart of the current test for status. This paradox is that the test for whether or not 
involuntary statutory obligations are engaged is based entirely on the law of voluntary 
obligations. Statute law and the law of contract are distinct legal disciplines. Each requires 
a separate approach. The mischief central to this thesis is how this confluence of 
involuntary and voluntary obligations has allowed employers in the gig economy (and 
elsewhere) to exploit the idiosyncrasies of the former in order to avoid incurring the latter. 
The second chapter will explain and explore both the current test for status and the ways in 
which this paradox has been exploited. The third will argue why reform is needed. The 
final chapter will propose an alternative which removes the contractual nexus from the 
status test altogether, housing employment rights wholly within the confines of statutory 
law and removing the paradox. With both rapid growth in the number of individuals 
participating in the gig economy
5
 and British withdrawal from the EU less than one year 
away, revision of the existing law is both necessary and timely. 
 
The specific focus of this thesis is the employment relationship in the emerging gig 
economy. A gig worker will be taken to be anybody working for a platform company. I 
will not seek to apply too prescriptive a definition to the term “platform company”, other 
than to give it two essential elements: the first is the existence of a tripartite relationship 
involving a customer, a company and an individual providing labour; the second is that the 
service of the individual is solicited digitally, whether through smartphone app, email or 
text message. Platform companies vary not only in the kinds of service they provide, but 
also in the nature of the relationships between the three elements in the tripartite structure. 
It is the nature of the relationship between the company and the individual providing 
labour that will determine the employment status of the individual providing labour. 
  
                                                 
3
 Most notably in Autoclenz Lrd v Belcher [2011], ICR 1157 
4
 See Good Work, The Taylor Review of Modern Working Practices, the Department of Business, Energy and 
Industrial Strategy, July 2017 
5
 Recent analysis estimates that the number of individuals participating in the gig economy in London 
increased by 72% between 2010 and 2016 (Stephen Devlin, Massive Surge in London’s Gig Economy, New 
Economics Foundation, 2016, http://neweconomics.org/massive-surge-londons-gig-economy/ ) 
3 
 
Platform work is not homogenous. The:  
 
nature of the tasks performed on crowdwork platforms may vary 
considerably and very often involves the allocation of “microstasks”; 
extremely parcelled activities, often menial and monotonous, which still 
require some sort of judgment beyond the understanding of artificial 
intelligence. […] In other cases, bigger and more meaningful works can be 
crowd-sourced such as the creation of a logo, the development of a site or 
the initial project of a marketing campaign.
6
 
 
Similarly, “work on-demand apps” cater for “traditional working activities such as 
transport, cleaning and running errands […] assigned through [smart phone] apps”.7 
Within both crowdwork platforms and work on-demand apps exists an entire spectrum of 
contractual relationships. At one end of this spectrum are companies such as eBay who 
provide little more than a virtual market place for individual buyers and sellers to contract 
with each other.
8
 A person selling a second hand dress on eBay, say, is not in any sense an 
employee of eBay. There are few elements of control: the seller has complete autonomy 
over price setting, she is responsible for marketing the items she is selling (in terms of the 
description)
9
 and what conduct rules exist are largely to ensure compliance with both the 
criminal and civil law.
10
 There is no requirement for personal service: individuals may sell 
goods owned by and on behalf of third parties, and there is no requirement that menial 
aspects of the sale (for example, the parcelling up or posting of the goods) are carried out 
by the actual seller herself.
11
 At the other end of this spectrum are companies such as the 
taxi firm, Uber. In contrast to the example of the relationship eBay has with its sellers, the 
relationship between Uber and its drivers does have many features which are clearly 
                                                 
6
 De Stefano, Valerio, The Rise of the “Just-in-time Workforce”: On-demand Work, Crowdwork and Labour 
Protection in the “Gig-economy”, Conditions of Work and Employment Series No.71, International Labour 
Office, p.3-4 
7
 Ibid, pg.4 
8
 eBay describes itself on its website (http://pages.ebay.co.uk/help/account/questions/about-ebay.html) as 
being “the world’s online marketplace; a place for buyers and sellers to come together and buy or sell almost 
anything” 
9
 The firms “minimum performance standards” are set out online at 
http://pages.ebay.co.uk/help/policies/selling-practices.html  
10
 The policies make express reference to the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008, 
the Electric Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 and the Sale of Goods Act 1979. Activities such as 
“shilling up” (that is, bidding on your own items at auction in order to inflate the price) are prohibited 
11
 There is dispatch guidance written in the second person (for example, “You should […] post items 
immediately after purchase” (Minimum Performance Standards, supra), although it is submitted that this is 
stylistic and that delegating these elements of the transaction to a third party would not invalidate the contract 
of sale 
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consistent with traditional employment:
12
 drivers are required to display the Uber logo on 
their cars (control); prices are set by the company (control); a driver who accepts a job is 
required to personally carry it out (personal performance) and the company has a code of 
conduct drivers are expected to abide by (control).
13
 
 
The degree of entrepreneurial freedom enjoyed by an individual designing logos or selling 
second-hand dresses is comparable to that of the traditional petite bourgeoisie (for 
example, a high street accountant or an independent retailer). In the traditional economy, 
these individuals’ economic autonomy remains largely unmolested by employment 
regulation. Conversely, the creative licence of the Uber driver is more restricted and 
consistent with that of an individual in an employment relationship with an employer. Such 
workers lack even basic creative and entrepreneurial freedom. Uber’s claim that its drivers 
were in fact a mosaic of self-employed businesspeople was described by the Employment 
Tribunal in Aslam as being both “contrary […to] simple common sense” and something 
which did “not correspond with practical reality”.14 
 
Therefore while the media of work assignment in the gig economy may be novel, the 
working relationships formed are not; “be it the breaking down of jobs into small tasks, to 
be completed by large crowds of workers, the role of powerful intermediaries, or the 
impact on wages and working conditions […] the underlying business model [in the gig 
economy] is nothing new.”15 The primary practical distinction between traditional work 
and gig work is therefore that the marketplace has migrated from the High Street into an 
area of virtual real estate. This familiarity, however, is difficult to square with the recent 
glut of litigation (discussed below) concerning the legal status of the relationship between 
gig workers and the platforms from whom their work is solicited. The logical corollary 
must therefore be that the current status tests are simply not working. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 See Aslam & others v Uber, 2202551/2015, paras.47 to 69; this first instance decision was upheld by the 
Employment Appeal Tribunal (UKEAT/0056/17/DA) 
13
 The driver code of conduct is published online (https://www.uber.com/en-GB/drive/resources/platform-
standards/).  
14
 Para.53, Aslam 
15
 Jeremias Prassl, Humans as a Service, Oxford University Press, 2018, p.75 
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1.2 EMPLOYMENT LAW IN THE U.K. 
 
Employment law in the UK is a mosaic of disparate legal sources, traditions and 
techniques. The full suite of rights and obligations existing between a given individual and 
the person she works for will be derived from sources such as a written contract, primary 
acts of parliament, secondary legislation, the common law, EU directives, and decisions of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) and the UK domestic courts.  
 
It was not always this way. Prior to the 1970s, “court-based sanctions played almost no 
role in the process of resolving industrial disputes, nor in the enforcement of collective 
agreements.”16 Statutory interference was only exercised either (a) to set wages in 
industries where “no adequate machinery existed for the effective regulation of the 
remuneration of the workers concerned”, such as the Wages Councils Act 1945;17 or (b) to 
implement “politically neutral measure[s] which largely sprang from a process of 
technocratic policy learning”, such as the Industrial Training Act 1964.18 The workforce 
during this period was largely unionised. The law allowed unions to benefit from a number 
of statutory immunities to common law delicts/torts for losses relating to strike action 
while asking very little of them in return.
19
 Statute even made it possible to force collective 
agreements upon unwilling employers under certain circumstances.
20
 Employment and 
industrial relations policy up until then had been largely underpinned by the principles set 
out in the Beveridge Report published in 1942.
21
 The report drew a distinction between 
two economically active groups: those who were employed and those who were self-
employed, the latter being “understood by Beveridge to be […] genuinely in business on 
their own account, and, therefore, needed less protection against the risks of 
unemployment, illness and old age than workers”.22  
 
                                                 
16
 William Brown, Simon Deakin & Paul Ryan, The Effect of British Industrial Relations Legislation 1979-
97, National Institute Economic Review, 1997, Cambridge University Press, p.70 
17
 Brodie, Douglas, A History of British Labour Law 1867-1945, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2003 
18
 Hugh Pemberton, The 1964 Industrial Training Act: a Failed Revolution, 2001 Economic History Society, 
Bristol, p.3 
19
 For example, the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act 1875 and the Trade Disputes Act 1906 
20
 The Terms and Conditions of Employment Act 1959 
21
 Social Insurance and Allied Services, November 1942 
22
 Simon Deakin, Does the “Personal Employment Contract” Provide a Basis for the Reunification of 
Employment Law?, Industrial Law Journal, Vol.36, No.1, March 2007, p.77 
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This would change from 1970 onwards. Global and domestic economic crises led to 
growing “public pressure for legal intervention in labour-management relations”.23 The 
Industrial Relations Act 1971 (“IRA”) was thus implemented in an attempt to “both restrict 
union abuses in the collective bargaining arena and provide statutory protection for […] 
employees”.24 This statutory protection took the form of rights, such as the right not to be 
unfairly dismissed. Where these rights were breached, employees could claim 
compensation from their former employer before an industrial tribunal. This new statutory 
regime created “a particular kind of juridical space populated by idiosyncratically designed 
personal work contracts, generally governed by a loosely pervasive set of discursive and 
casuistic common law principles [with a] separate and superficial normative layer” of 
statutory laws on top.
25
 
 
Two years after the IRA was implemented, the UK joined the EEC. At this time, Europe 
was evolving from its neo-liberal roots as a mere common economic area towards more 
complex and bureaucratic and social space. The concept of a European Social Model was 
“a flexible idea which embrace[d] an eclectic range of policies from employment law, as 
narrowly defined, to the creation of the welfare state, including education, healthcare and 
social security”.26 In the field of Employment law, this expansion led to the 
implementation of directives on maternity rights,
27
 the right to a written statement of 
terms
28
, working time
29
, redundancy consultations
30
, transferring undertakings
31
 and 
employer insolvency
32
. Jurisprudence from the European Court of Justice (in particular the 
decision in the case of European Commission v UK
33
) would also rejuvenate the Equal 
Treatment Directive of 1976. Europe-led reform of Health and Safety law
34
 during this 
period would further enhance the rights of workers with respect to their employers.  
 
                                                 
23
William B Gould, Taft-Hartley Comes to Great Britain: Observations on the Industrial Relations Act of 
1971, Yale Law Journal, Vol.81, No.8, 1972, 1421-1486, p.1,429 
24
 Gould,  ibid, p.1,423 
25
 Freedland and Kountouris, Towards a Comparative Theory of the Contractual Construction of Personal 
Work Relations in Europe, Industrial Law Journal, Vol.37, No.1, 2008, 49-74, p.63 
26
 Catherine Bernard, EU Employment Law and the European Social Model: The Past, the Present and the 
Future, Current Legal Problems, Vol.67 (2014), p.200 
27
 See, for example, the Pregnant Workers’ Directive, Council Directive 92/85 
28
 Directive on An Employer’s Obligation to Inform Employees of the Conditions Applicable to the Contract 
or Employment Relationship, Council Directive 91/533 
29
 See, for example, the Working Time Directive, Council Directive 93/104/EC 
30
 Council Directives 75/192 and 92/56 
31
 The Acquired Rights’ Directive, Council Directive 77/187 
32
 Council Directive 80/987/EEC 
33
 [1984] ICR 192 
34
 In particular, see Directive 89/391/EEC 
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Domestically, the 1980s would see widespread reform of industrial relations law. The 
statutory immunities would remain, but unions would now have to work harder in order to 
benefit from them. These reforms (later consolidated into the Trade Union and Labour 
Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (“TULRCA”)) included strict record keeping 
obligations upon the trade unions,
35
 enforced democratisation of the organisations
36
 and 
rigorous, prescriptive balloting and notification procedures to be carried out in advance of 
industrial action.
37
 The definition of a trade dispute was also narrowed. Members were 
given rights enforceable against their trade union, including the right not to be unjustifiably 
disciplined.
38
 These measures were introduced as part of a “series of initiatives sought to 
reduce the coherence of trade unions as collective organisations”.39 
 
Neither the provisions of the IRA nor any of the European employment rights directives 
fundamentally altered the legal principles at the heart of labour law, based as they were in 
the law of voluntary obligations. Instead, they added a further layer of regulation. UK 
employment law became a hybrid of both contract and statute law. These two legal 
disciplines required fundamentally different approaches: the role of the courts in the law of 
voluntary obligations “is to determine the contents of the agreement reached by the parties 
throughout a process of construction by which the terms of the contract are identified”, 
while statutory rights require a process of “interpretation [which] involves analysis of 
legislative text, where different considerations apply”.40 This paradox would eventually 
cause the boundary between employees and self-employed to blur. The structural cogency 
of the binary divide was no longer compatible with the changing industrial paradigm. 
 
By 1986, the binary divide had deteriorated to such an extent that a further category, that of 
worker, had to be introduced into the Wages Act 1986. The concept of a worker had 
existed in statute since the 1970s in matters peripheral to the core employment rights such 
as Health and Safety,
41
 but the 1986 Act for the first time brought it into the field of rights 
proper. The forebears of 1986 Act were the Truck Acts, which had existed in various 
guises since 1464 and sought to prohibit employers paying wages in kind rather than in 
                                                 
35
 Now found at Part I, Chapter III, TULRCA 
36
 Part I, Chapter IV, TULRCA 
37
 Part V, TULRCA 
38
 Part I, Chapter V, TULRCA 
39
 Paul Smith and Gary Morton, The Conservative Governments’ Reform of Employment Law, 1979-97: 
Stepping Stones and the New Right Agenda, HSIR 12 (Autumn 2001), 131-147, p.140 
40
 Simon Deakin, Labour Law and the Developing Employment Relationship in the UK, Cambridge Journal 
of Economics, Vol.10, 1986, 255-246, p.223 
41
 Such as the Health And Safety at Work etc Act 1975 
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“the coin of the realm”.42 The 1986 Act’s most immediate ancestor was the Truck Act 
1940, as amended by the Statute Law (Repeals) Act 1973. The protections of the 1940 Act 
extended to “workmen” rather than “workers” and covered only individuals involved in 
manual labour, to the exclusion of white collar workers.
43
 The 1986 Act removed this 
qualification and defined a worker as any individual who worked under a “contract 
whereby the individual undertakes to do or perform personally any work or services for 
another party”44 When the 1986 Act was consolidated into the Employment Rights Act 
1996 (“ERA”), this new status would be replicated45 and applied to other rights, such as 
the right not to suffer a detriment for having made a protected disclosure.
46
 Many new 
employment statutes, such as the Working Time Regulations 1998 (“WTR”) would also 
borrow this definition in respect of provisions relating to the right to paid annual leave and 
daily rest breaks.
47
 The status of “employee” would remain a formal and distinct status 
within the ERA, although it would also fall within the definition of “worker”, meaning all 
rights attaching to workers would also attach to employees. Table 1 provides an 
inexhaustive cross section of rights by status. 
 
Table 1: 
 
 
 
                                                 
42
 For a  brief historical overview see Lord Ackner’s judgment in Bristow v City Petroleym [1987] 1 WLR 
529 at 342 
43
 Sch.2, 1973 Act 
44
 S.8(2)(c), the 1986 Act 
45
 Now found at s.230(3)(b), ERA 
46
 Found at Part IVA, ERA 
47
 Reg.2, WTR 
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It is clear from table 1 that even once an individual has the fold of statutory protection, she 
will encounter a further bifurcation of rights. Employment law in the UK is thus stratified 
into three tiers: at the bottom are those designated as self-employed. These individuals 
have no rights under statute and can only rely on the rights they have under the common 
law and contract; in the middle are workers. These individuals are protected by statute 
against some of the most egregious employment abuses but have no end-of-work 
protections, such as a minimum period of notice, payment in the event of redundancy and 
protection from unfair dismissal; at the top are employees. Employees have access to the 
full suite of rights. Qualification for these rights is therefore a matter of some consequence. 
The following chapter will examine both the legal tests for qualification (known as the 
status tests) and explore the techniques employers have deployed in order to prevent their 
otherwise workers or employees from qualifying for these protections. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
CHAPTER 2 
2.1: THE STATUS TESTS 
 
The introductory chapter consisted of two parts. The first introduced the themes this thesis 
will consider, including a working definition of gig work. The second gave a brief 
historical overview of the evolution of employment regulation from the 1970s onwards 
into a separate statutory space of workers’ rights. The purposes of this thesis are to argue 
that the current tests for status – the legal passports into the statutory protections – are not 
working and to propose an alternative. This chapter will both explain these tests and 
consider ways employers can and do exploit aspects of these tests in order to deprive 
individuals of rights. 
 
In order to bring a claim alleging a breach of any particular right, an individual must 
establish that they qualified for that right in the first place. For example, where party A 
terminates a contract it has with party B, party B may or may not be entitled to bring an 
action for a breach of the right not to be unfairly dismissed.
48
 The legal basis of this right is 
s.94, ERA, which provides that “an employee has the right not to be unfairly dismissed”. B 
will only therefore be entitled to bring a claim for unfair dismissal if she can demonstrate 
that, at the time of her dismissal, she was an employee.
49
 The definition at s.230, ERA, 
provides that an “Employee” is an individual “who has entered into or works under […] a 
contract of employment”.50 Similarly, where party A and party B have contracted for party 
B to carry out services in return for a consideration to be paid by party A, and which party 
A has not paid, party B may seek to claim that her right not to suffer unauthorised 
deductions has been breached. She must have regard to s.13, ERA, which provides that an 
employer “shall not make a deduction from wages of a worker employed by him”. A 
“worker” is defined as an “individual who has entered into or works under […either] a 
contract of employment, or any other contract […] whereby the individual undertakes to do 
or perform personally any work or services for another party whose status is not by virtue 
of the contract that of a client or customer of any professional or business undertaking 
carried on by the individual”.51 Should party B be unable to satisfy either limb of this 
                                                 
48
 There may also be claims for damages under the common law 
49
 There are additional requirements necessary in order to qualify for this right, such as the individual having 
a sufficient period of continuous service in terms of s.108, ERA. There may also be issues as to whether or 
not the UK employment tribunal has geographical jurisdiction. Detailed consideration of these are beyond the 
scope of this work 
50
 s.230(1), ERA 
51
 s.230(3), ERA 
11 
 
definition, she will not have a statutory remedy for party A’s failure to pay (although she 
may have a remedy under the terms of the contract).  
 
The attainment of status is therefore crucial to the unlocking of the layers of statutory 
regulation. However, while status is a matter of statute, the determination of that status is a 
matter of contract. Qualification for employment rights therefore exists at a confluence of 
involuntary and voluntary obligations. This creates a paradox. An early attempt at 
resolving this paradox was made by the Court of Appeal in 1968, in the case of Ready Mix 
Concrete (South East) Ltd v Minister of Pension and National Insurance.
52
 The case 
considered the provisions of the National Insurance Act 1965 and, in particular, the 
conflict between statutory duties and voluntary obligations in respect of whether or not a 
contract of service existed. The court held that in order to determine the identity of the 
contract (and with it the status of the individual) regard should be had to three features: 
one, whether the individual agreed “in consideration of a wage or other remuneration, he 
will provide his own work and skill in the performance of some service”; two, whether he 
agreed “that in the performance of that service he will be subject to the other’s control”; 
and three, whether “the other provisions of the contract are consistent with its being a 
contract of service”.53 From this point forward, at least in law, it was not possible for 
parties to fix their status. This would fix the conceptual framework for the rights 
incorporated by the IRA and subsequent employment law statutes. 
 
The test for employee status set out in Ready Mix Concrete would be further refined 
through case law. The present state of the law requires an employment tribunal not to treat 
“any one test or feature [as] conclusive” but to “weigh all the factors in the particular case 
and ask whether it is appropriate to call the individual an employee”.54 This was further 
expressed by Mummery J in Hall v Lorimer (C.A.)
55
 as being an exercise in considering 
“many different aspects of that person’s work activity. [It] is not a mechanical exercise of 
running through items on a check list to see whether they are present in, or absent from, a 
given situation. The object of the exercise is to paint a picture from the accumulation of 
detail, which is not necessarily the same as the sum total of the individual details.”56 
However, while the approach is multifactorial, in order for a contract to be one of 
employment, irrespective of all other factors, it must contain three essential elements: (1) 
                                                 
52
 [1968] 2 QB 497 
53
 Ibid, per McKenna J 
54
 Harvey on Industrial Relations and Employment Law, Div.AI, para.39 
55
 [1992] ICR 739 
56
 Ibid at 744 
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personal service; that is, the requirement that the worker will undertake to carry out the 
work personally;
57
 (2) control; that is, that the employer has a sufficient degree of control 
over how the worker carries out the work;
58
 and (3) mutuality of obligations; that is, that 
there are ongoing requirements for both the employer to pay the worker, and for the worker 
to be ready, willing and able to carry out work.
59
 Longmore LJ described these criteria as 
“the irreducible minimum [of requirements] for the existence of a contract of 
employment”.60 
 
When Ready Mix Concrete was heard in 1968, employment law was based on a binary 
divide: there were employees and there was everyone else. By 1986 however the new 
category of “worker” had been added. The definition of worker would include both 
individuals working under a contract of employment and individuals who had undertaken 
“to do or perform personally” work for another party.61 The wider group, workers, qualify 
for a number of the basic protections, such as the right not to suffer unauthorised 
deductions from their salary
62
 and the right not to suffer a detriment for her having made a 
protected disclosure
63
. However, only employees qualify for the end-of-employment rights, 
such as the right not to be unfairly dismissed
64
, the right to a minimum period of notice of 
termination
65
 and the right to a payment upon redundancy.
66
 This dual status reflects the 
different statutory origins of these rights.
67
 This ERA definition of “worker” is replicated 
and cross referenced in a number of other employment law statutes (for example, the 
Working Time Regulations 1998 at reg.2(1), the Trade Union and Labour Relations 
(Consolidation) Act 1992 at s.230 and the Employment Relations Act 1999 (“the 1999 
Act”) at s.13(1)) however, it is not universal in its application. TUPE, for example, applies 
to “employees” but defines an employee as “any individual who works for another person 
                                                 
57
 For an up-to-date discussion on the law in respect of personal service, see the Court of Appeal’s judgment 
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58
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62
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65
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66
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67
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whether under a contract of service or apprenticeship or otherwise but does not include 
anyone who provides services under a contract for services”.68 This definition is broad 
enough to encompass both employee and worker status. The Equality Act 2010 (“EqA”) 
similarly takes a slightly different approach in that it does not create the status of employee 
rather it defines “employment”; that is, employment “under a contract of employment, a 
contract of apprenticeship or a contract personally to do work”.69 This EqA definition of 
employment is broader still than either TUPE or ERA: a commercial agent, for example, 
may be in employment in terms of EqA, but would not be an employee in terms of either 
TUPE or the ERA.
70
  
 
The second limb of the worker definition is a “statutory extension” to this employee 
status.
71
 In order to satisfy the definition of a worker, the individual will still be required to 
demonstrate elements of personal service and control however they will not be required to 
demonstrate that there is a mutuality of obligations.
72
 The distinction between employee 
and worker is whether or not there is an ongoing mutuality of obligations between the 
parties or whether the engagements are piecemeal and isolated contracts. 
 
By evoking the common law definition of a particular kind of contract, the definitions of 
worker and employee set out at s.230, ERA have allowed the courts to adopt a more fluid 
approach than they may have been able to had the statute taken a more prescriptive 
approach. There are two significant advantages to this. The first is that, as the creation of a 
“precise definition” of a contract of employment was acknowledged by Lord Denning as 
being “almost impossible”,73 the broad, descriptive approach removes the need for this. 
This approach devolves a great deal of the discretion for determining what is (and, just as 
crucially, what is not) a contract of employment to the judiciary in general and, having 
regard to the limited grounds of factual appeal,
74
 to the tribunals at first instance in 
particular. The success relies on the assessment of the nature of the task at hand; that is, 
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69
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that while a precise definition is elusive, “it is often easy to recognise a contract of 
[employment] when you see it”.75 
 
The second is its flexibility. There are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of 
by statutory draftspeople. By avoiding the prescriptive approach, the courts and tribunals 
have (to some extent) been able to keep pace with technological and organisational 
changes which are constantly redefining the employment relationship. A number of recent, 
high profile cases such as Pimlico Plumbers Ltd v Smith
76
 and Aslam v Uber
77
 (both of 
which will be discussed in greater detail below) have showcased the adaptability of the 
status test to new working arrangements; both of these cases concerned business models 
arranged around the allocation of work by use of smartphone platform; a technology 
presumably far beyond the contemplation of the original statutory draftspeople. These 
gains in flexibility are, to some degree, offset by the losses in both legal certainty inherent 
in descriptive legislative provisions and consistency.
78
 The volume of the above mentioned 
high profile cases currently climbing the UK’s appellate court ladder is perhaps an 
indictment of the degree of uncertainty (and perhaps even subjectivity) caused by this 
approach. 
 
The purpose of parties reducing the terms of an agreement to writing is to create a record 
of the legal relations they intended to form. This in turn provides contracting parties with 
certainty. In a commercial context, such certainty is a necessary prerequisite to the conduct 
of business: a building company, for example, will be unlikely to part with the outlay 
required to complete large infrastructural projects where it knows the party it is contracting 
with may not be held to the terms agreed. While written terms are not quite sacrosanct,
79
 
they almost always create obligations on parties which are legally enforceable. The 
emphasis on certainty in contract law does however provide an opportunity for employers 
drafting contracts otherwise of employment to deprive workers of that status. The inclusion 
of an express term purporting to disavow any of the requisite elements of a contract of 
employment will, in some circumstances, have the effect of locking the worker out of her 
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statutory rights. The following section will consider both the legal mechanics of how this is 
achieved and the ways appellate courts (in particular the Supreme Court) have sought to 
prevent the practice. 
 
 
2.2: THE RUSE: 
HIDING A CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT IN PLAIN SIGHT 
 
The grounding of employment law in the law of voluntary obligations was, on first 
analysis, a liberal development: while the pre-existing master-and-servant laws imposed 
some degree of obligations upon the master, they were a two-way street: servants were 
liable to criminal censure for non-performance, and the “laws were used to […] reduce the 
bargaining power of workers and shore up managerial prerogative”.80 Master-servant laws 
were further stigmatised though their association with slavery in parts of the British 
Empire, as they had been in West Indian plantations and South African mineral mines.
81
 
Basing the new legal framework on the law of contract would, at least in theory, give 
parties the freedom to contract with each other as equals. The practice in twenty first 
century Britain is, however, different. The economic reality and current socio-political 
consensus is that, with the exception of those wealthy enough to survive solely upon the 
income generated from their wealth, at least one member of every household is required to 
engage in some form of remuneratory economic activity. The state provides a basic safety 
net of welfare provision to those either unable to do (whether through age, infirmity or 
familial care commitments) or unable to find work however the basic presumption is that 
every household must work in some capacity. It may therefore be said that while many 
individuals have freedom of contract, they have no freedom to contract. The exception to 
this is individuals who are self employed however for many trades and occupations, there 
are no practical or competitive ways to become self employed. 
  
Contracts entered into where there is a lack of freedom to contract are often referred to in 
academic literature as “contracts of adherence”.82 Contracts of adherence exist in areas of 
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economic life such as car insurance, personal banking and residential property letting. Such 
contracts are characterised by an imbalance of power between the parties. One party will 
be a business and the other an individual who is required to contract through either legal or 
cultural norms (such as in the case of car insurance and bank accounts respectively), or 
through financial and practical necessity (such as in the case of renting a flat). The 
combination of this lack of freedom to contract, the imbalance of power and the dynamics 
of business efficiency ordinarily result in contracts of adherence rarely being entered into 
by means of open negotiation. They often contain standardised terms and are offered to the 
individual on á prendre ou á laisser basis.
83
 In employment law, the practice of offering 
employment on the basis of a standardised contract is so widespread that “in the absence of 
a recognised union, it [is] extremely rare for any negotiation over terms and conditions” to 
take place.
84
  
 
The policy response aimed at mitigating the imbalance of power in contracts of adherence 
is to construct a regulatory scaffold around these contracts, whether through the common 
law or through statute.
85
 The latter creates relationships between the parties which are legal 
hybrids comprising both voluntary and involuntary obligations. These policy responses are 
often successful in redressing the imbalance. The extent to which the law should intervene 
in these relationships is a matter of political taste however the legal facility to intervene 
does exist. 
 
Employment contracts as contracts of adherence do however pose a unique difficulty. 
Whereas it will be obvious if a party is contracting to insure a car or lease a property, the 
line between parties contracting for services under a contract of employment and parties 
contracting for services under an ordinary commercial contract is often unclear and 
indistinct. The problem this creates for the regulation of employment relationships is that 
the former is ordinarily convened under a contract of adherence (and is therefore apt for 
statutory regulation) and the latter under an ordinary, freely negotiated contract (and 
therefore falls outwith the policy scope of statutory regulation).  
 
One purpose of this chapter is to illustrate ways in which an employer may try and disguise 
a contract in order to avoid it being one which would create a rights-attracting status for 
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their employee. Thus far, my analysis has considered a number of definitions of employee, 
employment and worker. For the sake of this sub-chapter, I will restrict our analysis to the 
two statuses created by the ERA: that is, employee and worker. By implication a third 
group will also exist of individuals who fit neither definition. I will refer to this group as 
independent contractors. In order to qualify for either definition, both employee and 
worker will be required to demonstrate the control and personal service elements of the 
test; only an employee will be required to demonstrate that there is any degree of ongoing 
mutuality of obligations. Of these three grounds, only mutuality and the personal 
performance requirement are absolute for employment contracts. The requirement for 
control is a matter of degree. The existence of “obligations on the employer to provide for 
the employee and on the employee to perform the work”, according to the Court of Appeal, 
is a “sine qua non which can be firmly identified as an essential of the existence of a 
contract of service”.86 The insertion into a contract of terms which obscure or negate the 
existence of either of these facets will result in the individual providing labour forfeiting 
her statutory protections.  
 
In the case of employee status, for example, an employer may insert a term into a contract 
for service denying the existence of any ongoing requirement to provide work. The 
individual providing labour will therefore be a worker and forego the rights she would 
otherwise have as an employee. I will refer to these as “zero hours” clauses. The factual 
reality of whether she actually works full time hours on a regular basis will be subverted by 
the existence of this express clause. Similarly, an employer may insert a term that confers a 
right onto the individual providing labour to sub-contract her work. Where this right is 
complete and unfettered, the personal service requirement will be broken and the 
individual will be an independent contractor and further forego all rights under the ERA. 
Again, whether or not she ever does sub-contract the work will be largely irrelevant 
provided the existence of the right can be demonstrated.
87
  I will refer to these clauses as 
“substitution” clauses. 
 
The correct treatment of these terms is currently unclear as the authorities do not speak 
with one voice. In large part, this lack of clarity is a product of the hybrid nature of 
employment law. The fact that the basis of the employment relationship is contractual and 
not statutory requires tribunals and appellate courts to construct the terms of the agreement 
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in accordance with ordinary principles of contractual construction (subject to the common 
law idiosyncrasies of employment contracts); that is that a court, in determining whether a 
particular contract is a contract of service, must consider “what people say” rather than 
“what [they] think in their inmost minds”,88 The common law doctrine of expressum facit 
cessare tacitum
89
 prevents a court or tribunal from implying terms into a contract where 
express terms already exist.
90
 Therefore where a clause had been inserted into a contract 
that the employer was under no obligation to give, and the worker was under no obligation 
to carry out, a minimum amount of work, the courts would be prevented from implying 
mutuality of obligations. 
 
There are exceptions to this. The first is where both parties have conspired to fix the 
statutory nature of their contracts by agreement in order to avoid some obligation to the 
state. This is frequently the case in contracts upon which employee/worker status may 
depend, where there may be mutual tax benefits for both parties at the expense of the 
treasury if their relationship is characterised in a particular way.
91
 Where parties attempt to 
do this, “it is trite law” that their characterisation will not be determinative, as parties’ legal 
relationship is “an objective matter to be determined by an assessment of all the relevant 
factors”.92 The second is where the contract is voidable because one of the parties only 
contracted on the basis of an error that had been induced by the other party.
93
 The third is a 
new ground specific to contracts of employment and was created by the Supreme Court in 
Autoclenz Ltd v Belcher.
94
 Lord Clark stated that in “deciding whether the terms of any 
written agreement in truth represent what was agreed […] the written agreement is only a 
part” of the overall factual matrix that must be considered, and that “the relative bargaining 
power of the parties must [also] be taken into account”.95 The decision in Autoclenz turned, 
to some extent, on the English contract law concept of “sham”.96 Under this concept, 
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contract terms are unenforceable if the “acts done or documents executed by the parties to 
the ‘sham’ […] are intended to give to third parties or to the court the appearance of 
creating between the parties legal rights and obligations different from the actual legal 
rights and obligations […] the parties intended to create”.97 Prior to Autoclenz, the 
appellate authorities in cases relating to employment status had set their faces against 
allowing one party to a purported contract either of employment or for services to ignore 
express clauses on the basis of sham.
98
 The reason for this was that the above quoted 
Diplock dictum required both parties to have conspired with the intention of deceiving a 
third party, rather than one party seeking to escape unilateral statutory obligations it would 
otherwise have in respect of the other. Autoclenz refines this test for employment contracts. 
 
The “relative bargaining power of the parties” consideration will likely require further 
judicial refinement; the judgment gives no detail as to the factors tribunals should consider 
when assessing the relative bargaining power or the weight they should attach to each 
factor. While the direction of jurisprudential travel appears to be away from holding 
workers strictly bound to express terms in their contracts where they do not reflect the 
reality of their working arrangements, the extent to which Autoclenz allows tribunals at 
first instance to disregard express clauses in contracts for services is as yet unclear. 
Similarly, no guidance was given as to either what terms were apt to be ignored or how 
tribunals should set about constructing new terms in their place. This is particularly 
problematic insofar as the Supreme Court did not expressly overturn the Court of Appeal 
decision in Stevedoring & Haulage Services Ltd v Fuller:
99
 Unlike Autoclenz and Pimlico 
Plumbers, which both concerned a substitution clause, Stevedoring concerned a zero hours 
clause. It had been argued by the claimants that this clause should be disregarded and 
replaced with a clause requiring the employer to provide “a reasonable amount of casual 
work”.100 This argument was rejected by the Court of Appeal. Their reasons were 
expressed by Tuckey LJ as follows:  
  
“If there was a contract we cannot see any way in which the ET’s implied 
terms could be incorporated into it. The implied terms flatly contradict the 
express terms contained in the documents: a positive implied obligation to 
offer and accept a reasonable amount of casual work (whatever that means) 
                                                 
97
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cannot be reconciled with express terms that neither party is obliged to offer 
or accept any casual work. None of the conventional route for the 
implication of contractual terms will work. Neither the business efficacy nor 
necessity require the implication of implied terms which are entirely 
inconsistent with a supposed contract’s express terms”101 
 
The extent to which Autoclenz goes as far as to either overturn the decision in Stevedoring 
or disapply the principle of expressum facit for the purpose of employment law must 
therefore be treated with caution: the Court of Appeal in Pimlico Plumbers subsequently 
quoted Stevedoring with approval and it must, for the time being, be considered good law. 
This is problematic in that it leaves the law in a state of uncertainty. The key distinction 
between Autoclenz and Stevedoring is that while the court in Autoclenz was considering the 
extent to which a clause in a contract could be ignored, in Stevedoring it was being further 
asked to construct a new one in its place. The extent to which an employment tribunal is 
entitled to construct terms is unclear and, at present, the subject of some contradictory lines 
of authority.
102
 The Court of Appeal in 2010
103
 held that a tribunal had been “exercising 
the power of the civil courts [when it sought] to declare what a contract meant or to rectify 
an error manifest in an otherwise binding contract” and that the court was “unanimously of 
the opinion that the words in the [ERA] do not mean and were not intended to mean that an 
industrial tribunal could rewrite or amend a binding contract”.104 The reasoning is, in one 
sense, legally sound: it would be ultra vires for a statutory court to go beyond what it has 
been empowered to do by legislation. It does however create a difficulty where a sham 
zero hours clause has been identified by the Autoclenz dictum, insofar as while the tribunal 
is empowered to ignore the clause, it is prevented from inserting a new one in its place. 
The mischief intended to be remedied (that is, the sham lack of mutuality) will remain. 
This creates difficulties for the individual seeking a claim of unfair dismissal. Whereas the 
individual claiming unpaid wages pursuant to a disputed zero hours clause has a choice of 
remedy between an action for unlawful deduction before the tribunal (who cannot 
construct a new clause) and an action for breach of contract in the civil court (who can), 
there is no civil court equivalent to a breach of the right not to be unfairly dismissed. The 
restricted facility to construct terms may therefore prevent an individual bringing a claim 
for unfair dismissal even in circumstances where the tribunal has identified the zero hours 
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term denying her employee status (and with it the right not to be unfairly dismissed) as 
being an Autoclenz sham. While this seems unsatisfactory, that makes it neither illogical 
nor something that is contrary to parliamentary intentions: the disputed clause in Autoclenz 
was a substitution clause. Had the court not allowed this clause to be ignored, the claimant 
would have been removed from the field of statutory employment protection entirely. 
However as the clause in Stevedoring related to employee status, the claimant still retained 
the core protections of worker status, which was not in dispute. The public policy reasons 
for ensuring individuals obtain the basic worker protections are arguably greater than those 
for ensuring workers obtain employee status, particularly insofar as they relate to the right 
to get paid wages, and concern aspects of health and safety. 
 
The Stevedoring decision, whilst complying with expressum facit, is not easily reconcilable 
with other existing authorities. The sole significance of mutuality, as espoused by Elias J in 
Stephenson v Delphi Diesel Systems Ltd,
105
 is “that it determines whether there is a 
contract in existence at all”.106 Note that Elias J does not say that it is not determinate of 
whether there is a contract of employment, but merely determinative of whether there is a 
contract at all. Mutuality has no wider application. Once a contract has been established, 
the tests of control and of personal service then determine whether it is a contract of 
employment or a contract of some other kind. Whether or not a mutuality of obligation 
exists is primarily a matter of fact. In this sense, when the court in Stevedoring did not treat 
mutuality as a factual indicator of the legal relations created when the parties contracted, it 
took it into the realm of the abstract and treated “mutuality” (or lack thereof) as being 
something self-evidently probative of a contract of employment rather than just of a 
contract at all. If one applies Elias J’s reasoning in Stephenson to the reasoning in 
Stevedoring, the logic of the latter collapses entirely: in determining whether a contract 
exists or not, the Court in Stevedoring relied upon a term in that contract denying its very 
existence. 
 
A final, further point on the issue of ignoring express terms is that there is Scottish 
authority for the position that where one party to a contract did not understand the “legal 
effect of words to which a very artificial operation is ascribed by a highly technical rule of 
law”, consensus was not reached.107 The mechanism by which a contractual term excluding 
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mutual obligations can lead to an individual not having the right either to a redundancy pay 
or to not be unfairly dismissed, even some 20 or 30 years down of employment down the 
line, is something which is arguably both an artificial operation of law and highly 
technical. Whether or not the individual contracting understood the legal effect of that term 
at the point of contract is a matter of fact, but whether that would be sufficient to render the 
clause unenforceable is a matter of law and, to the best of my research, is yet to be decided 
in a Scottish tribunal. It should be cautioned that both Gloag and McBryde treat the 
reasoning in Harvey with some trepidation; the latter going as far as suggesting that it was 
“wrongly decided”.108 
 
This chapter has sought to explain the law relating to the status tests, with a particular 
focus on judicial treatment of terms whose purpose or effect is to deprive individuals of 
that status. The Supreme Court, both in Autoclenz and, more recently, in Pimlico, have 
stretched the ordinary principles of contract law in order to allow a more flexible approach 
to be taken in the case of contracts purportedly of employment. This is to be welcomed. 
However, there are limits to what can be achieved through case law alone: regardless of 
how far the Supreme Court is prepared to stretch the law of contract, it cannot overrule 
statute. Therefore provided the current statutory test remains, the paradox will remain and 
employers will retain the opportunity (at least to some extent) to deprive workers of their 
status. Removing this paradox entirely will only be achieved through statutory amendment. 
 
While this thesis has argued that there are problems with the current status tests, it has not 
yet argued either why this is problematic or why reform is necessary. This will be the focus 
of the following, penultimate chapter. Once the case for reform has been made, the final 
chapter will set out those reform proposals. 
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CAPTER 3 
3.1: BAD GIGS 
 
The opening two chapters considered the contractual basis of the current status tests and 
considered how this contractual basis can be (?) exploited by employers in order to deprive 
their workers of employment rights. This chapter will argue that this is problematic, not 
only for individuals working in the gig economy, but also for other workers, other 
businesses and society as a whole. It will do so by considering three areas: protection of 
individual rights; rights of workers during a business transfer; and collective rights.   
 
Gig workers have hitherto fallen into a political blind spot. This is likely the consequence 
of these workers being both too few in number and too economically marginal to force a 
specific political agenda. Indeed, the trade union antipathy towards casual work (discussed 
below) has perhaps deprived these workers of the one source of political advocacy other 
workers have come to rely upon. With participation in the gig sector on the increase 
however the issue will likely gain political momentum. Indeed, the issue of “zero-hours 
contracts”, a working concept exhibiting themes interchangeable with “the gig economy”, 
has already featured in the election literature produced by the Labour party during both the 
2015 and the 2017 elections.
109
 Criticisms of the sector have also featured in a number of 
recent scholarly works, notably by Prassl.
110
 Whether or not gig workers can develop what 
a Marxist might refer to as “class consciousness” remains to be seen however as the sector 
grows, so will its political influence.
111
 This chapter will make the case for such reform. 
 
 
3.2: INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 
 
The existence of self-employed workers, in the sense of individuals who have made an 
informed and free choice to go into business on their own account, is something with no or 
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little political will to change. Despite the trend among small businesses such as 
shopkeepers, restaurateurs and farmers to move away from non-affiliated independent 
small businesses and towards either franchised or managed chains,
112
 self-employed 
individuals still account for a large portion of the overall workforce.
113
 Similarly, there is 
still a presumption in the UK that those of working age who are fit to work should.
114
 The 
social contract between workers and the state therefore remains (to some degree) 
operational. Both for the wilfully self-employed and the fully employed, the orthodoxy 
holds. The problem however is the existence of a group of individuals who fall between 
these two extremes. Without straying too far into issues of nomenclature, I will avoid using 
the classification of “bogus self-employed” for this group both because it is unnecessarily 
emotive and because the legal status of individuals within this group will vary between 
“self-employed” and “workers” depending on the particular circumstances of the 
relationship. Similarly, there will be individuals within this for whom the flexibility of gig 
work is of genuine benefit. The oft-cited example of students being able to earn a living 
around their studies is the go-to cliché for the existence of this group.
115
 This group will 
instead be referred to as gig workers, although it is appreciated that there are types of 
casual work that do not fit the definition advanced above for the gig economy. 
 
The fact that Aslam is considered a victory for the gig workers and a defeat for Uber is, of 
itself, telling.
116
 The decision unlocked for the claimants only the modest protections of 
worker status. The claimants did not even sue for full employment status, presumably on 
the basis that the area of law is so settled that unless they could demonstrate a clear, 
ongoing obligation to provide a minimum amount of work, employee status cannot be 
determined: gig work is characterised by the piecemeal allocation of tasks. By its nature, 
those engaged to provide labour have no ongoing formal legal obligations in respect of the 
companies. The Tribunal at first instance instead held that it is only when the app is turned 
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on for the purposes of accepting tasks that they are workers.
117
 The removal of the 
requirement to provide a minimum amount of work has consequences that go beyond mere 
legal taxonomy however. It will also allow the employer to transfer a portion of its 
economic risk onto the workforce: under conditions of mutuality, where an employer 
experiences a reduction in its requirement for labour, it is required to either continue 
paying its employees or dismiss a portion as redundant, incurring liability for notice and 
redundancy payments. In the case of the gig workers however, the business may simply 
adjust its labour costs accordingly by offering its workers (and consequently having to pay 
for) fewer or no hours of work. The economic consequences of the downturn as to the 
labour costs therefore will be borne exclusively by the gig worker, as they will receive less 
work and consequently a lower salary as a result.  
 
This seems manifestly unfair, particularly when viewed in the context of the kinds of 
worker whose roles are vulnerable to demutualisation. Demutualisation is a feature of 
vertical disintegration. Firms vertically integrate into markets in order to obtain “a degree 
of insurance against the risk that the market will not provide sufficient numbers of 
adequate quality of services or products required”.118 In a labour market context, engaging 
workers under permanent contract of employment represented the purchase of this 
insurance; the rights and guarantees gained by the worker in the bargain are the price the 
employer is willing to pay to avoid having to rely on the market to have good and available 
workers at the point of need. Vertical disintegration is therefore only possible where the 
work is of a kind that the labour market can be relied upon to produce. The rarer or more 
sought after the skill or qualification required by the role, the less likely a business is to 
rely on the market having available the right number and quality of those particular 
workers at any given time. Conversely, the lower the skill level required by the role, the 
easier it will be for the business to find workers when required   
 
Workers in low skilled roles are accordingly the more at risk of losing their employment 
status than workers in higher skilled occupations. This is unsatisfactory. Workers with 
skills which are in demand are less likely to require statutory protection, as they will be in 
a stronger position to negotiate better voluntary terms with their employer at the outset of 
the relationship. The fact individuals with weaker negotiating clout may, in consequence of 
this weakness, end up not only with less favourable contractual terms, but also receive 
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fewer or no statutory protection, doubles down on their misfortune. It simply cannot have 
been the intention of Parliament when legislating in favour of employment rights that they 
would only extend to individuals who were in a position to negotiate favourable terms in 
the first place. 
 
Even where gig workers are able to demonstrate worker status, they will miss out on the 
end-of-employment protections and a guaranteed minimum amount of work. Such 
exclusion (and with it the lack of job and wage security) will often lead to further adverse 
consequences to individuals: mortgage providers’ lending criteria often require individuals 
to be in permanent or long-term employment prior to approving a loan.
119
 In consequence, 
gig workers may be excluded from the property ladder and, with it, the social and 
psychological benefits of homeownership.
120
 This in turn may also have broader social 
consequences: econometric analysis from both the United States and Germany has shown a 
statistically significant correlation between homeownership and “variables that […] 
measure good citizenship”, such as participation in local politics, the carrying out of home 
repairs and regular garden work, and volunteering.
121
 Research also indicates that job 
and/or wage insecurity “may have as [psychologically] detrimental consequences as job 
loss itself” and can impact negatively on an individual’s “work attitudes and behaviour”.122 
The new model of platform companies such as Uber and Airbnb also operate on an entirely 
flat structure without area managers or supervisors. In consequence, workers in these 
models have little opportunity for career progression, as the only routes to increasing 
income are either to drive more hours or to rent out rooms more often. In contrast to the 
myth of gig economy creating a “wave of small-scale entrepreneurship”123, the market 
dominance of these platform behemoths will likely stifle small business by pricing out 
individuals who would otherwise have started their own taxi firm or B&B.  
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The demutualization of the employment relationship may also have broader implications 
on the public purse: the UK has a range of both in- and out-of-work benefits, including 
Income Support, Working Tax Credit and Housing Benefit.
124
 Where the effects of a 
business downturn are passed onto the worker by way of reduced hours and, in 
consequence, salary, a portion of these effects will be further passed in turn onto the public 
by way of increased cost of benefits. In a sense, this issue touches upon the policy question 
at the heart of employment law: where should the economic risk lie? That is, whether and 
to what extent it should be with the business owners or their workers. The United 
Kingdom’s economic, social and legal infrastructure exhibit features which are conducive 
towards good business: it has world class education
125
 and free health care systems; civil 
and criminal legal codes concerned with the protection of private property; separate legal 
personage for business entities and limited liability; and extensive financial, transport, 
telecommunications and export infrastructure. In return, the public places certain 
expectations upon businesses: corporation tax is levied in order that a portion of profits 
may be reinvested in the public services and infrastructure; a range of duties are imposed 
by statute upon company directors
126
 and legislation provides employees with a range of 
rights enforceable against their employers. Therefore, while the basis of employment law is 
contractual in nature, the contract of employment has been recognised by Parliament (as 
identified by the Supreme Court) as distinct from other contracts, in that it is “characterised 
by an imbalance of economic power” in which the employee is vulnerable “to exploitation, 
discrimination, and other undesirable practices, and the social problems which can 
result.”127  
 
Features specific to particular platform business models may also have discriminatory 
consequences for workers which, by nature of the businesses’ structure or data recording 
practices, render the worker without any form of legal recourse: some platform models, 
such as Uber, operate a “rating” system which allows passengers to rate their drivers 
between one and five. Drivers with a mean rating lower than 4.6 are at risk of being 
deactivated.
128
 Drivers for whom English is not their first language may find it more 
difficult to gain a rapport with passengers than native English speakers and may receive 
lower ratings in consequence. Similarly, foreign born or ethnic minority drivers may 
receive lower scores from customers as a result of conscious or unconscious biases. While 
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less favourable treatment on the basis of an individual’s nationality or language would fall 
within the scope of the protection of the Equality Act 2010,
129
 the rating system which 
disadvantages minority, foreign-born or non-English speaking drivers would likely only 
fall within the definition of indirect (as opposed to direct) discrimination and would 
therefore be capable of being objectively justified by employers.
130
 The worker would also 
be required to demonstrate that people sharing her protected characteristic would be likely 
to be placed at a disadvantage by the ratings system. In order to do this, she would be 
required to obtain large amounts of data from her employer detailing the both ethnic mark-
up of their workforce and the breakdown of customer feedback; details that gig employers 
are often reluctant to keep, particularly where worker status is disputed. 
 
Leaving aside arguments based on fairness, the degree of legal uncertainty arising in cases 
where employee or even worker status is unclear can be detrimental to both worker and 
employer. Employment status is determined by operation of a set of legal principles which 
are often both esoteric and contradictory. This again is unsatisfactory. A business will plan 
financially according to its liabilities. If an employer mistakenly believed it was engaging 
self-employed contractors rather than hiring workers, it may find itself unexpectedly 
responsible for redundancy payments in the event of it terminating their contracts. Such an 
unanticipated outlay may cause the business problems with cash flow which in turn might 
compound the initial problem. Greater certainty of this relationship would have allowed 
the business to hold back a reserve of cash in order to meet its liabilities. Similarly, the 
purpose of statutory minimum notice periods and redundancy payments is to cushion the 
financial impact of sudden forced unemployment. An individual may be entitled to but not 
actually receive these protections until some time after the termination of her contract 
where an employment tribunal has to determine her status. The entire business model of a 
company can turn on the subjective application of a wide set of facts to a number of vague 
rules. This has left the law in a state of chronic uncertainty, not only for lay individuals but 
also for their advisors. The volume of cases currently ascending the UK’s appellate ladder 
attests to this uncertainty. Contrast the decision of the Employment Tribunal in Aslam with 
that of the Central Arbitration Committee in Independent Workerts Union of Great Britain 
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(IWGB) v RooFoods Limited T/A Deliveroo, for example.
131
 In both cases, the companies 
(Uber and Deliveroo respectively) have identical work allocation methods: individuals are 
offered and accept individual work assignments via smartphone app. However in the case 
of the former, the individuals were said to be s.230(3)(b) limb workers; while in the latter 
the individuals were held to be independent contractors. This uncertainty is a further case 
for reform and simplification of the position. 
 
Further evidence of uncertainty can be observed in two recent judgments of the EAT. 
These decisions will briefly be considered by way of illustration; these are Blakely v On-
site Recruitment Solutions Limited & Heritage Solutions City Limited
132
 and Dynasystems 
for Trade and General Consulting Limited v Mosley.
133
 Blakely concerned a tripartite 
relationship between a building contractor (H), a worker (B) and an employment agency 
(OS). On the face of it, B had been supplied by the agency, OS, to work for H. The EAT 
overturned the decision of the Employment Tribunal at first instance which found that B 
and H could not have intended to form legal relations separate to the legal relations formed 
between either B and OS, or H and OS. Such a line of authority potentially opens the door 
for tribunals to imply entire contracts where ostensibly none existed. 
  
Dynasystems on the other hand concerned an employer operating under a “labyrinthine” 
corporate structure.
134
 Despite having signed a contract of employment with one corporate 
entity, the claimant claimed that he had in fact been employed by another entity altogether. 
Applying Autoclenz, the employment judge held that the contract the claimant had signed 
with the first company could be disregarded as all the other facts were consistent with the 
claimant in fact having been employed by the second company. On appeal, the EAT 
refused to interfere with this finding. The effect of Autoclenz has in some respects added to 
the general uncertainty in respect of the law of employment status. The error of law 
identified by the EAT in Blakely was the Tribunal’s failure to consider using the discretion 
provided to first instance courts by the Supreme Court in Autoclenz to depart from the 
strict common law position of James v Greenwich London Borough Council.
135
 The Court 
of Appeal in James had held that “the question of whether an “agency worker” is an 
employee of an end-user must be detailed in accordance with common law principles of 
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implied contract and, in some very extreme cases, by exposing sham arrangements”.136 The 
power of a tribunal to disregard contractual terms (or, in the case of Dynasystems, an entire 
contract) has thus created a twin-track approach to status tests which is entirely contingent 
upon the willingness of the particular tribunal to apply an Autoclenz disregard to a 
contractual term. Where a tribunal is willing, it has licence to construct the terms of the 
relationship in such a way as conforms with the factual reality; where the tribunal is not, 
the parties will be held to the stark formalities of the contract. 
 
 
3.3: THE TUPE LACUNA 
 
The Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006 (“TUPE”) are 
a statutory instrument made under s.2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972 in order 
to give domestic effect to Council Directive 2001/23/EC. The 2006 regulations replaced 
the previous regulations made in 1981,
137
 which themselves had given effect to an earlier 
European Council Directive (“the 1977 Directive”).138 By the time the 2002 Directive 
came about, the provisions of the earlier Directive had been significantly expanded by the 
case law emanating from the ECJ.
139
 The 2002 Directive gave legislative effect at EU level 
to this judicial expansion. The 1981 Regulations had been enacted by a Conservative 
government with a self-confessed “remarkable lack of enthusiasm”140 and had suffered 
censure from both the House of Lords
141
 and the ECJ.
142
 By contrast, the 2006 Regulations 
would go beyond what was required by the 2002 Directive: case law from the ECJ began 
moving in the opposite direction to that which it had previously, notably in Alemo-Herron 
& Others v Parkwood Leisure.
143
 Similarly in 2014, the coalition government moved to 
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trim “gold plating” from the Regulations:144 that is, domestic provisions with protections 
“exceeding the requirements of EU legislation”.145 
 
The current incarnation of TUPE, as amended by the Collective Redundancies and 
Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) (Amendment) Regulations 2014 
(“CRATUPE”), operates to protect the rights and employment of employees assigned to 
organised groupings of resources subject to a relevant transfer in terms of reg.3, TUPE. 
There are three ways by which these protections are achieved. First, reg.4 operates to 
recreate the contractual relationship the transferring employee had with the transferor, 
including “powers, duties and liabilities under or in connection with the contract,146 in a 
new relationship with the transferee. Variations made to these terms made because of a 
relevant transfer which are not economic, technical or organisational changes entailing a 
change in the workforce (“an ETO defence”), will be void. Second, reg.7 makes dismissals 
because of a transfer automatically unfair, subject to the employer being able to 
demonstrate an ETO defence. Third, reg.13 imposed an obligation upon an employer to 
provide affected employees with prescribed information prior to a transfer taking place. 
Where the transferee envisages taking measures in connection with the transfer, the 
employer will also be subject to a duty to consult. 
 
“Employee” is defined within TUPE as “any individual who works for another person 
whether under a contract of service or apprenticeship or otherwise but does not include 
anyone who provides services under a contract for services”.147 The definition is therefore 
broader than that of “employee” within s.230(1), ERA, which restricts the definition to 
those working under a contract of employment (see above). Therefore, someone whose 
status is that of a s.230(3)(b) limb worker should in principle qualify for the protections of 
TUPE. There is however a difficulty: a quirk of the Regulations is that the first and second 
protections do not create any rights of action in and of themselves, but instead create 
statutory mechanisms by which rights of action conferred under other statutes will be 
breached: for example, where TUPE operates to void a purported contractual variation, 
payment at the lower rate will breach an individual’s right not to suffer unauthorised 
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deductions for which is a right she has under s.13, ERA. Her right of action will be under 
s.23, ERA. Similarly, where an individual is dismissed because of a transfer, it will breach 
her s.94, ERA right not to be unfairly dismissed. Her right of action will again be under 
s.111, ERA. Therefore in order to bring any claims, the individual must refer back to the 
status tests within the ERA.  
 
This quirk removes the teeth not only from the reg.7 protection against dismissal because 
of a transfer, but also from the reg.4 protection of transferring contract terms. While any 
purported change to a term contained in a transferring contract will still be void, a 
transferee could circumvent this simply by only offering the transferring workers 
employment (in the reg.2, TUPE sense of the word) on new terms. As these new terms will 
be distinct contracts and not purported variations to existing terms, the voiding mechanism 
contained within reg.4(4), TUPE will not have effect. So while the provisions of TUPE 
apply to gig workers in principle, there is no way to enforce the reg.7 right and reg.4 is 
easily disarmed. The only real, enforceable right TUPE confers upon workers without 
employee status is the right to be informed and consulted in advance of a transfer.
148
 This 
is a lacuna in the Regulations: individuals who habitually work for an employer under 
contracts of service but who lack the ongoing mutuality of obligations required to identify 
such an engagement as being under a contract of employment, are therefore considerably 
more vulnerable to dismissal and variation by incoming employers than employees. 
 
In a gig economy context, this again places workers at a disadvantage compared to 
employees in traditional employment. While gig economy workers are not unique in only 
being able to establish s.230(3)(b), ERA limb status, this growing (and likely to grow 
further) constituency places this lacuna in the context of the policy debate surrounding 
status. TUPE’s absence from the debate is likely a product of the fact that most of the high 
profile cases concern the boundary between s.230(3)(b), ERA limb and self-employed 
status (which unlocks only the basic worker protections of the ERA) rather than between 
s.230(3)(b), ERA limb workers and s.230(1), ERA employees. The extent to which this is a 
product of the requirement to establish a contractual nexus prior to establishing full 
employee status follows from the fact that the reg.4 and reg.7, TUPE protections are only 
enforceable through rights of action contained within the ERA. What is true for status tests 
within the ERA is therefore true of TUPE. By removing this contractual basis of this test 
and replacing it with a single status statutory test, this lacuna can be avoided. However, 
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while such a test will mitigate the reg.7 difficulty, further reform to reg.4 will be required. 
Reg.4 operates by voiding purported variations made because of a transfer. If the 
underlying contractual position remains the same regardless of the status test, transferee 
employers may again simply offer the transferring employees work on similar terms. 
Consideration will be given in the final chapter as to how this problem can be solved. 
 
 
3.4 COLLECTIVE RIGHTS 
 
The focus of my comparison between gig workers and employees in traditional 
employment has thus far been confined to the individual legal protections (or comparative 
lack thereof) given to the worker enforceable against her employer. These individual rights 
do not however exist in a vacuum, but comprise only one aspect of worker protection. The 
other is the collective industrial pressure the worker and her colleagues can bring to bear. 
That a gig worker is in a weaker position than a comparable worker in traditional 
employment as far as individual rights are concerned is not necessarily a bad thing in and 
of itself, provided there is a corresponding increase in her ability to exert collective 
pressure on her employer. In this sense however the gig workers again fare worse than 
those in traditional employment. The reasons for this are both legal and organisational. 
Legally, the primary vehicle for protecting a worker’s right to strike is through the law of 
unfair dismissal: the dismissal of an individual for taking part in official industrial action 
will be automatically unfair, provided the worker’s trade union has complied with the 
consultation, notification and balloting requirements of TULRCA.
149
 Even where the trade 
union has not complied with these requirements, dismissal for taking part in official 
industrial action will be automatically unfair unless the employer dismisses every striking 
worker, adding a further layer of collective protection.
150
 The law does not however 
provide a similar prohibition on subjecting a worker to a detriment short of dismissal for 
her having taking part in industrial action.
151
 The legal protection is therefore only as good 
as a worker’s right not to be unfairly dismissed; again, where a worker cannot show that 
she works under a contract of employment, she will not qualify for the right and, in 
consequence, will receive little statutory protection if she engages in industrial action. The 
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sole statutory protection available to striking gig workers is under the Employment 
Relations Act (Blacklists) Regulations 2010 (“the Blacklisting Regulations”), which 
prohibit employers from keeping lists containing “details of persons who are […] taking 
part or have taken part in the activities of a trade union”. 152  
 
Further to these legal difficulties, certain organisational and physical features of platform 
businesses also militate against workplace organisation. Trade unions have “failed to 
organise […] and to gain recognition for collective bargaining purposes”, reflecting an 
“inability to organise […] in the new kinds” of workplaces along similar lines to the 
organisation in industrial workplaces.
153
 The allocation of work by app deprives workers of 
a central, physical hub where they otherwise might be able to congregate and form “the 
communal ties” that are often necessary for collective action.154 Similarly, the “ratings” 
systems discussed above, whereby the likelihood of work being assigned to a given gig 
worker is based on feedback received from customers, may serve to punish workers 
involved in industrial action, as they will not be assigned (or will not accept) work during 
the period of strike. Failure to either accept or carry out tasks will result in workers being 
assigned less work or even having their account deactivated altogether. Either outcome 
provides a powerful disincentive for individuals to attempt to negotiate with the threat of 
industrial action. These are the sticks to discourage striking. There are also carrots: the 
ultra-market responsive nature of wages to any supply/demand fluctuations in the gig 
economy almost always works in the employer’s favour; companies that employ casual 
labour only do so because there exists an excess supply of labour. An excess demand for 
labour would mean companies would routinely struggle to fill positions. Under these 
circumstances, engaging as many workers as necessary under full contracts of employment 
would ordinarily be the reaction of a rational employer, as it would guarantee certain levels 
of staffing while allowing the employer to benefit from a status trade-off, whereby workers 
accept a lower wage in exchange for the actual and potential benefits of employee status. 
The only time this will not hold true is where the excess demand for labour is only in the 
short term; such as would be the case where strike action was being taken. Under these 
circumstances, strike-breaking employees may be able to exact a salary premium for 
continuing to work. Contrast this with the position of a strike-breaking employee in 
traditional employment, who will receive the same salary irrespective of whether her 
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colleagues are taking industrial action. The “strike-break premium” therefore locks gig 
workers into a prisoner’s dilemma with each other: where no workers strike break, all the 
workers will reap the benefits of their collective stance; however, where even a handful of 
workers strike break, the collective position will be fatally undermined, leaving the non-
strike breakers with nothing while the strike breakers benefit from the strike-break wage 
premium.   
 
While smartphones and gig working may be relatively recent phenomena, casual labour is 
not. Neither, for the reasons set out above, is trade unionist opposition to its use. Fee-
charging employment agencies have long been perceived by the movement as being “a 
threat to the substantive and procedural interests of unionised workers […who] undercut 
terms and conditions, promote the growth of temporary work, undermine collective 
bargaining and supply strike-breakers.”155 The readily substitutable nature of much of gig 
work makes the workers again vulnerable to being replaced by strike-break agency staff. 
Some of the failure of the trade union movement to break significant ground in the new, 
post-industrial sectors in the UK is no doubt attributable to these organisational challenges 
to collectivism.  
 
All of this is problematic, particularly insofar as the right to strike is now recognised as 
forming part of UK’s domestic code in consequence of British membership of both the EU 
and ECHR.
156
 While the right for gig workers to join and, at an appropriate time, to 
participate in the activities of a trade union are, in theory, protected by law, such rights are 
futile if the workers’ bargaining position is not reinforced by their having ultimate recourse 
to industrial action. The absence of such a threat fundamentally undermines the worker-
side negotiating credibility. The UK may therefore, despite having neither infringed nor (at 
least nominally) failed to safeguard these rights, remain in default of its obligations under 
both EU and ECHR. This is the case not only for gig workers, but also for casual work as a 
whole. As such, the lacuna between the UK’s supranational obligations in respect of 
industrial relations law and its execution predates the rise of platform work. 
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3.5: CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has considered three separate areas where the protections available to gig 
economy workers are weaker than those available to workers in traditional employment. 
Even where gig workers can establish s.230(3)(b) limb status, they still receive much 
diluted protection following either a business transfer or industrial action. In large part, this 
is due to the lack of unfair dismissal protection; the protections of both TUPE and 
TULRCA are reinforced by creating automatic breaches of the s.94, ERA right not to be 
unfairly dismissed. The solution must therefore be to remove the two-tier gradation of 
rights and extend the right not to be unfairly dismissed to all workers.  
 
The status test proposed in the following chapter will seek to achieve this by creating a 
single status of employment, divorced from the contractual nexus. The mere act of giving 
gig workers this right will not, of itself, remedy the issues considered in this chapter. This 
is because the definition of “dismissal” contained in the ERA is predicated on the 
termination of a contract.
157
 The proposal will therefore also include a consequential 
amendment to this definition. In so doing, all workers will receive the full legal protections 
considered in this chapter. It will also lift gig workers into the s.103A, ERA protection 
from dismissal because of their having made a protected disclosure. This should have a 
wider social benefit: in order to qualify for this protection, the individual must have made 
the disclosure “in the public interest”.158 The fact that there is currently no protection 
offered to gig workers reporting unsafe or illegal goings on in the gig economy should be a 
concern. This consequential amendment will be discussed in full below. 
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CHAPTER 4 
4.1: FUTURE REFORM AND THE PROBLEM WITH TAYLOR 
 
In the foregoing chapter, I sought to build on the legal analysis advanced in the earlier 
chapters to provide a critique of both the structural and doctrinal soundness of the contract-
status based hybrid nature of employment law. There were two elements to the structural 
critique. The first were the contradictions and shortcomings replete in the current status 
tests. The second was the ease with which employers, whether by accident or by design, 
have been able to circumvent these tests and deprive individuals providing labour for them 
of employment rights, both in terms of the full gamut of employee protection and the 
weaker protections afforded to workers. My doctrinal critique considered normative issues 
of both the lack of legal certainty and the unfairness inherent in allowing some individuals 
to be deprived of statutory rights on an arbitrary basis. Both in collective and individual 
protections, gig workers fare worse than those in employment. I have argued that while 
evolutionary reform may address some of the doctrinal issues in the meantime, the 
contractual basis of the relationship creates a fundamental structural weakness that can 
only be overcome by removing the contractual qualification from the statutory protections 
altogether. This chapter will present a conceptual basis for this new relationship.  
 
A theme which has run through this thesis is the hybrid nature of employment law: that is, 
that the rights, duties and obligations incumbent upon parties involved in a working 
relationship are derived from both contract and statute. Of itself, a hybrid is not 
problematic. There are many areas of Scots law which combine both statutory and 
common law elements; the criminal law, for example, similarly draws upon both sources; 
an individual may be accused of both murder and rape under the same indictment, the 
former being a common law offence and the latter being statutory.
159
 The difficulty with 
the employment law hybrid, I have argued, is that there is a statutory bridge between the 
two. This bridge is the contract of employment. This chapter will argue in favour of 
retaining the hybrid system, but removing the statutory bridge between the two.  
 
While the contract of employment as the legal hook into statutory protection has always 
had the potential to be problematic, the gig economy has allowed this to escalate. Policy 
attempts to address these problems have been flawed in two respects. The first is that they 
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have been evolutionary rather than revolutionary: the creation of a half-way status (the 
‘s.230(3)(b) limb’ workers) mitigated rather than solved the problem. It also led to the 
creation of a two-tier workforce, as those with only half-way status would only benefit 
from some of the statutory protections. Another such evolutionary change was the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Autoclenz, which allowed courts and tribunals to disregard 
express terms in contracts of employment in certain circumstances. As argued above 
however this change has only led to further confusion and greater inconsistency. The 
proposal set out in this chapter seeks a clean break and removes the contractual vestige 
from the statutory test altogether. 
 
The second is that the approach has been reactive rather than proactive: changes in the law 
have occurred only in response to changes in technology or workplace norms. None of the 
employment law changes have sought to anticipate market disruptions and plan ahead 
accordingly. To some degree, this has been mitigated by the commendable flexibility of 
the current approach. The proposed test will seek to retain this flexibility, but is designed 
with atypical workers in mind. The speed with which app based companies have come to 
dominate particular markets is a warning to both employees in other industries and policy 
makers.
160
  
 
The Taylor Review published its recommendations in July 2017. The review had been 
commissioned by the Conservative government with a view to “tackling exploitation […]; 
increasing clarity […]; and aligning [the] labour market with [the] modern industrial 
strategy”.161 Despite the high rhetoric, the recommendations were underwhelming. The 
main proposals included codification of the current common law status principles into 
legislation, purportedly with a view to making the test “simpler, clearer and to give 
individuals […] a greater level of certainty”;162 renaming s.230(3)(b) limb workers as 
“dependent contractors”, purportedly (and somewhat confusedly) to reflect the growth in 
the number of “independent relationships” outwith those of traditional employment;163 and 
giving workers with no guaranteed hours “the right to request” a contract with fixed hours 
after one year.
164
 None of these proposals get to the root of the problem. The first two are 
entirely cosmetic: in the absence of any explicit proposals as to how the test could be 
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simplified, statutory codification simply takes confusing case law and transposes it into 
confusing legislation; similarly, re-branding s.230(3)(b) limb workers will, of itself, 
achieve little; a worker by any other name would still have no right not to be unfairly 
dismissed. The third is toothless. The right to request fixed hours already exists for 
individuals as citizens of a free and democratic society. Unless the right creates an 
obligation to accept under certain circumstances, then it is of little substantive import.  
 
 
4.2 REPATRIATION OF EMPLOYMENT LAW 
INTO SOCIAL POLICY 
 
In the opening chapter, I considered the issue of contracts of adhesion. I defined a 
“contract of adhesion” as being a contract characterised by two factors. The first was that 
there is an imbalance of power between the contracting parties. The second was that the 
weaker party is under an obligation to contract due to one or more legal, economic or 
cultural requirements: so while an individual has the freedom to choose with which 
insurance company she decides to insure her car, she is not free to drive her car unless she 
contracts with at least one of them. In the context of employment, this requirement arises 
in consequence of the cultural and economic requirement for each household to carry out 
some form of remunerated economic activity. Again, while households may chose to enter 
self-employment, the practical reality for many occupations is that this is simply not a 
workable or desirable option. The primary purpose of employment law is to mitigate the 
first factor; that is, to redress the power imbalance between the employer and employee. 
While the remainder of this chapter will argue in favour of removing the contractual basis 
from the status test altogether (and, in consequence, negating the problems caused by a 
contract of adhesion), I will first briefly consider a solution which would mitigate the 
second factor; that is, the cultural and economic requirement for each household to work. 
 
The Universal Basic Income (UBI) is “an income paid by a political community to all its 
members on an individual basis, without means test or work requirement”.165 By providing 
individuals with an income that is not dependent on the work requirement, those who 
chose to work under a contract for services do so in a manner that is truly voluntary. As 
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such, the individual inherits not only the freedom of contract, but also the freedom to 
contract. The individual should therefore be in a stronger position to negotiate the terms 
upon which she provides her labour than when she has no choice but to work. The 
provision of UBI should also, in theory, mitigate the social impact of bad employment 
practices, thus allowing for a relaxation in the current regulatory regime surrounding 
employment law and giving businesses greater freedom as to how they form and regulate 
their relationships with workers. 
 
A more in depth analysis of UBI is beyond the scope of this thesis however it is mentioned 
for the purpose of illustrating a further point: the problems caused by precarious 
employment are both social and individual. When the Beveridge report was published in 
1942,
166
 it placed the employment relationship within the context of the social contract 
between citizen and state: the citizen works and contributes taxes, and in return the state 
will educate her children, take care of her when she is sick and make provision for a 
financial safety net during periods of involuntary unemployment. Since this time, however, 
employment policy and employment laws have migrated away from the Rousseauvian 
paradigm and instead form part of the government’s economic strategy.167 This may, in 
part, explain the difference in both impact and scope between Beveridge and Taylor. 
Workers today are regarded in policy terms as being one interested party in a three-
stakeholder business matrix. The role of government employment policy is to find a 
balance between the competing interests of these three stakeholders which is conducive to 
economic growth. The other two interested stakeholders are shareholders and creditors. 
Shareholders invest in companies. This investment, in turn, drives economic growth. 
Limited liability is the ultimate shareholder protection as it limits the level of personal 
exposure shareholders have in respect of both creditors and workers in the event the 
companies they have a stake in become insolvent. Creditors help stimulate growth in 
companies, as they allow companies to invest in capital stock and labour inputs beyond the 
value of the company’s cash reserves. Creditor protection is provided by a variety of legal 
tools, including the right for creditors to apply for a company to be placed into 
insolvency,
168
 the facility for creditors to have securities and floating charged granted in 
their favour and the imposition of a range of statutory duties upon company directors, 
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including to have regard to the interests of the company’s creditors.169 The third group in 
this balance are the workers. Statutory employment laws protect workers against the 
interests of the company (the legal embodiment of the shareholders) while the common 
law duties of fidelity and faithful service provide the company with reassurance and 
grounds for separation from the workers. 
 
Any fundamental re-working of employment law should therefore retain, at its core, the 
principle that employment protections are a social imperative rather than simply a 
counterweight to the interests of big business. The necessary effect of this however is that 
the rights of businesses to arrange affairs on their terms will be curtailed to some extent. 
This may be politically unpopular and would certainly buck the trend of recent European 
case law which has placed the right of an individual to run a business alongside the 
workers’ rights.170 There is a context and a social need for this however: in the introductory 
paragraphs, I drew an analogy between the first industrial revolution and the current, 
ongoing gig-working revolution. This analogy only gets us so far. There are a number of 
crucial differences between these two events. In the first industrial revolution, the creation 
of labour saving devices such as the mechanised looms and the steam engine, allowed the 
cost of production to be significantly reduced. The creation of such machines along with 
both the capacity to mass produce and the willingness of countries to share technology 
across international borders created a genuine and global market disruption. By contrast, 
the smartphone revolution has done very little to decrease non-labour production costs: the 
price of driving someone in a car and driving them from A to B has not been significantly 
reduced by the advent of the app-based ordering service. Replacing the telephone operator 
with a downloadable app will likely have a negligible impact on the overall cost of 
production, as the marginal cost of a telephone operative for each journey is small and 
these costs will have been replaced to some extent with the cost of developing, maintaining 
and marketing the app. The primary advantage to a business of hiring gig workers is that it 
creates ultra-efficiency in its labour costs: by making “employment and wages more 
flexible, gig employments shift the risk of economic fluctuations onto the workers”, 
allowing employers to increase and decrease staffing levels to precisely match demand.
171
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The market disruption caused by the smartphone revolution has therefore been achieved 
largely by paying those providing labour less rather than by any genuine innovation. 
 
This should be regarded as separate and distinct from technological advancements which 
achieve gains in efficiency through increased automation. Such advancements represent 
genuine innovation. Workers in certain roles will undoubtedly lose jobs and suffer a 
reduction in their bargaining power (resulting in lower wages) in consequence however 
there is little political will or social impetus to stifle such innovation.
172
 Further, it is 
difficult to identify a way in which such advancements could be deterred by changes in 
employment law: the most obvious solution would appear to be through the imposition of a 
“robot tax” upon companies making use of automation.173 
 
The gains in efficiency caused by atypical working relationships make workers’ rights in 
any industry vulnerable. In any given industry, a company is only required to find a 
workable formula for the digital allocation of work and obtain a critical mass of market 
capitalisation. It can then rely on market forces to achieve dominance.  
 
None of this is to say however that there cannot be a business case made for this proposed 
rationalisation of the test for employee status. There are two arguments in favour. The first 
is certainty. A growing number of business models will find themselves in a position 
where they are unable to determine with any degree of certainty whether they are engaging 
employees, workers or self-employed contractors to carry out work on their behalf. In 
some cases, this uncertainty will only be definitively answered upon exhaustion of the 
UK’s appellate court structure. Businesses like certainty, even in cases where there is a 
premium by way of increased regulation to be paid. This was evident in responses to the 
coalition government’s consultation in advance of the 2014 amendments to TUPE: 
proposals to remove the service provision change (“SPC”) were roundly rejected by 
business respondents who broadly considered that the benefits [of SPC], in particular the 
legal certainty […], outweighed potential benefits that may arise from their removal.”174 
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The current glut of case law in relation to employee status is reminiscent of the state of the 
law in relation to disputed transfers immediately prior to the enactment of the SPC 
provisions; the law was, according to the EAT, “in a state of critical uncertainty. It [was] 
almost impossible to give accurate advice to employees, trade unions, employers or others 
involved in possible transfers with any degree of certainty.”175 A similar rationalisation of 
the status tests providing greater certainty of outcome would assist businesses with 
planning and financing their models. 
 
The second is consistency. The ability of one business to gain a competitive advantage 
over another solely by manipulating the contractual status of its workers is not only unfair 
to the workers, but also to the businesses in competition with it. Businesses who engage 
workers under contracts of employment will find themselves with no way of competing 
other than to ape the manipulations of their competitors. By closing off the loopholes 
caused by the vagaries and inconsistencies in the current law, businesses will compete with 
each other on a level playing field. 
 
 
4.3: RETURN TO A TWO TIER STATUS 
 
As alluded to earlier in this chapter, the advent of the s.230(3)(b) limb worker status 
extended protection for certain statutory rights to those who were not working under 
contracts of employment but who nonetheless contracted to personally provide labour. The 
advent of this status protected workers from some of the most egregious abuses of their 
employment rights, such the non-payment of wages and their being dangerously 
overworked.
176
 It stopped short of providing the financial security of the end-of-
employment protections contained within the ERA. It also left these workers vulnerable in 
the event of their being assigned to an organised grouping of resources undergoing a 
relevant transfer in terms of reg.3 TUPE. Workers are also locked out of the benefits of 
maternity leave and shared parental leave; indeed the partners of workers will, under some 
circumstances, also be locked out of being able to take advantage of shared parental 
leave.
177
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The Taylor Review began by setting out “seven steps towards fair and decent work”, the 
first two of which read respectively that “the same basic principles should apply to all 
forms of employment” and that for individuals involved in “platform based working 
[s.230(3)(b) limb] worker status should be maintained”.178 This is a contradiction in terms. 
Maintenance of the three tier structure will by definition provide greater levels of 
protection to some forms of employment than to others. My proposal in this chapter test 
seeks to go beyond Taylor and argues in favour of a single employment status. 
 
The creation of a single status will provide gig workers with the right not to be unfairly 
dismissed. As discussed in the previous chapter, the lack of unfair dismissal protection has 
a knock-on effect for other protections. Extending the right to all gig workers will provide 
them with meaningful protection in the event of a transfer or industrial action; two of the 
areas considered in the previous chapter where legal protections for gig workers were 
lower than those in traditional employment. 
 
This will of course create a further difficulty: under the current ERA scheme, in order to 
exercise end-of-employment rights, the individual seeking will not only have to 
demonstrate that she was employed under a contract of employment, but also that that 
contract was terminated, whether by the employer, by expiry or by her in circumstances 
where she was entitled to do so.
179
 Without a contract, there can be no termination; without 
a termination, there can be no dismissal; without dismissal, there cannot be a breach of 
either the right not to be unfairly dismissed or the right to a redundancy payment. This 
presents a legal challenge. This challenge and the proposed solution will be considered in 
detail below.  
 
 
4.4: THE STATUTORY TEST FOR EMPLOYMENT STATUS 
4.4.1: THE ROOT 
 
Thus far, I have argued that the current statutory test for employee or worker status is in 
need of reform. In particular, I have criticised the contractual basis of the test for status. 
The remainder of this chapter will concentrate on the creation of a new test for 
employment status. There is nothing in Scots law which prevents individuals from forming 
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relations with and discharging obligations in respect of one another which are not based on 
contract. In the case of Dow v Tayside University Hospital NHS Trust
180
 for example, it 
was held that a pursuer was not entitled to damages against her doctor under the law of 
contract as contractual relations had not been formed. The relationship was based on the 
duty owed by the defender to the pursuer imposed by statute
181
 rather than pursuant to any 
obligations voluntarily entered into between the parties. While this statutory relationship 
was not to the absolute exclusion of the parties forming separate contractual relations, the 
principle did “no more than leave the door […] slightly ajar”182 and “any additional 
contract […] would require to be expressed in clear terms”.183 Applying this reasoning to 
the statutory based employment relationship, parties would still be free to engage in 
contracts which fit the current definition of a contract of employment. 
 
The proposed test is based on a number of principles. The most important of these will be 
the removal of the discretion to determine the character of any relationship away from the 
parties themselves and giving it to the tribunal. In essence, it will complete the task which 
began with Ready Mix Concrete. The justification for this is that in practice the terms of a 
contract of employment are rarely negotiated freely between the parties but are ordinarily 
set by the employer. The contractual scheme has allowed employers to include terms 
which sought to deprive individuals of their status, either as workers or as employees. Prior 
to Autoclenz, there was little scope for challenging these terms. Even after Autoclenz 
however, courts still appear reluctant to disregard express contract terms (see, for example, 
Deliveroo). The second principle is that, where an individual works for another in an 
employment relationship, her statutory rights should not be any less than those of any other 
individual in employment on the basis of a highly technical term buried within a contract, 
particularly where that term has been put there in order to deprive her of those rights in the 
first place. The purpose of the proposed test is not to put gig economy workers in a 
position which is advantageous to individuals working under traditional and obvious 
contracts of employment, but merely to bring them into line with those workers. The third 
is that balance should be struck which still provides employers with a degree of flexibility. 
Similar to the second principle, the purpose of the proposed test is not to unduly punish gig 
economy employers, but to simply bring their statutory obligations into line with those of 
other employers. The fourth is functionality. The more Byzantine statutory provisions 
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become the more difficult they are to enforce. The proposed test therefore seeks to avoid 
unnecessary formality; for example, using a “reasonableness” qualification rather than 
prescribing values such as time or quantities of work. 
 
The first subsection of the proposed test will read as follows: 
 
“A person, A, is an employee of another, B, where B has offered to provide, and A has 
agreed to carry out and has carried out, work in an employment relationship” 
 
There are four basic elements to this definition: the first is that B must have offered to 
provide work. It is not anticipated that this offer requires to be bespoke to A. By sending 
out offers of work on a digital platform, an employer is offering to provide work, even if 
the precise identity of A is not known at the time the offer was made; the second is that, 
following this offer, A must have agreed to carry out the work. The basis of the statutory 
test will therefore retain the contractual character of an “agreement” between two parties 
(“where B has offered to provide and A has agreed”), but shorn of the common law 
baggage associated with the law of contract. The basic bilateral character of the contractual 
relationship has also been retained, subject to the implications of the below discussion in 
respect of agency workers; the third is that, while the agreement by A to carry out work for 
B is the genesis of the employment relationship, it must be consummated by A actually 
carrying out the work. There is no requirement however that the work be carried out for B. 
The test is therefore broad enough to cover employment agencies. The linguistic vehicle 
for this is by use of the verb “to carry” in its past imperfective tense (“A […] has carried 
out”). The purpose of using the past imperfective as opposed to the past perfective (that is, 
“A carried out”) is to connote the ongoing nature of the relationship. In some senses, this 
limb evokes the requirement for mutuality of obligations as its original form by Elias J in 
Stephenson, as discussed above; that is, it is simply a test for some form of ongoing 
relationship (in the case of Stephenson, a contract of employment), rather than being 
determinative of the type of contract in consideration (which a zero hours’ clause in a 
contract seeks to achieve). What a tribunal will be attempting to establish in these cases is 
whether or not there is or was an ongoing relationship between the two parties; the fourth 
is that the work must have been provided “in an employment relationship”. The proposed 
test will not contain an exhaustive or prescriptive definition of what and what is not “an 
employment relationship” however it is proposed that the following subchapter should 
contain a list of factors a tribunal must have regard to when determining whether or not the 
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relationship between A and B is one of employment. The proposed content of this 
subsection will be considered in the following subchapter.  
 
 
4.4.2: “AN EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP” 
 
While the test for whether or not one individual is working for another is contained within 
the first thee limbs of the proposed test set out above, the fourth will be the key to 
determining whether of not he is working as an employee or in some other capacity. It is 
proposed that a checklist of factors which a tribunal must have regard to is set out in a 
separate subsection. This element of the test for status has sought to retain the essential 
freedom of the tribunal to use its discretion in order to determine whether or not any given 
working relationship is one of employment or not. For this reason, I have avoided using 
any prescriptive approach other than to require the tribunal to have regard to certain 
factors. 
 
In determining the question of whether or not a relationship is an employment relationship 
for the purposes of subsection (1), regard shall be had to- 
(a) The terms of any document relating to the relationship between A and B, including: 
(i)  The terms of any written agreement between A and B; 
(ii) The terms of any collective agreement between B and a Trade Union 
representing a bargaining unit of which A is a member; 
(iii) Any policies produced by B in order to govern its relationship with A; 
and 
(iv) Any other relevant document; 
(b) Whether or not there is a clear expectation that A will carry out the work 
personally; 
(c) The degree of entrepreneurial freedom A has as to the manner in which he carries 
out the work; 
(d) The nature of B’s business; 
(e) Any other relevant circumstances consistent with an employment relationship. 
 
In considering any term contained within any document for the purposes of (a)(i), regard 
should be had to the relative bargaining power between A and B at the time the terms of 
those documents were either agreed, amended or came into force. 
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The structure of this subparagraph of the test borrows heavily from the statutory test for 
unfair dismissal.
184
 
 
 
4.4.2.1: “THE TERMS OF ANY DOCUMENT” 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the Autoclenz test is a constructive tool, exclusive to 
contracts of employment and service, developed by the Supreme Court, which allows 
tribunals to ignore express contractual terms under certain circumstances.
 185
 A distinction 
should be drawn at this point between the contract of employment as a legal concept, 
which comprises the entire body of rights, duties and obligations existing between an 
employer and an employee; and the contract of employment in the narrower sense of a 
written document bearing the title “contract of employment”. The latter is perhaps a 
misnomer: the document is not the contract but merely a written record of the terms the 
parties have agreed to contract upon. A general principle of contract law is that parties will 
be bound by the terms of any written agreement (see above). Autoclenz allows a tribunal to 
disregard terms contained with written agreements under certain circumstances by having 
regard to the relative bargaining power of the parties. 
 
This consideration alone cannot be determinative of the enforceability of any contractual 
provision: many commercial contracts are characterised by an imbalance of power: where 
a large local authority procures services from a self-employed electrician, the local 
authority will be in stronger position. Similarly, where a dairy farmer agrees to sell milk to 
Tesco, it will be the supermarket who largely dictates terms. Conversely, many contracts of 
employment are not characterised by an imbalance of power: an exceptionally talented 
soccer player, for example will be in a position to negotiate terms above and beyond her 
salary (for example, the squad number she will wear or the existence of a buy-out clause). 
The purpose of the test should instead be to identify whether the relationship more closely 
resembles a contact of adherence rather than a genuine contract freely negotiated between 
two parties. In the examples given above of commercial contracts characterised by an 
imbalance of power, while the more powerful side may be in a position to negotiate a price 
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that is more favourable to them, it is unlikely that they will exhibit any other features of a 
contract of employment: the contract between the self-employed electrician and the local 
authority, for example, will likely not include a disciplinary policy that the electrician 
agrees to subscribe to; the farmer will similarly not be likely to have to operate a punch-
card.  
 
The significance of Autoclenz is rooted in the primacy of the contracts of employment and 
service (and hence to written agreements which purport to record their terms) to the current 
test for status. The proposed test will remove the primacy of the contract to status however 
will seek to retain the utility of written records as a guideline to what the true agreement 
was; more often than not, a written record will be a fair truthful reflection of the 
relationship between the parties. The first paragraph of the above subsection therefore 
requires regard to be had to the terms of “any document relating to the relationship 
between A and B”. Sub-paragraphs then go on to list particular documents or types of 
document that should be considered, including any agreement between A and B directly. 
The Autoclenz approach should be retained as an interpretative tool for this limb of the 
statutory test. 
 
Sub-paragraph (ii) concerns collective agreements between the employer and any trade 
union negotiating terms on the employee’s behalf. “Collective Agreement” will have the 
same statutory definition as contained within s.178, TULRCA. Again, the nature of the 
inquiry is not to treat one factor as being determinative, but to amass as many relevant 
facts as possible and reach a conclusion. The presence (or indeed absence) of a collective 
agreement should assist in this endeavour. 
 
Sub-paragraph (iii) requires the tribunal to consider any documents produced by B in order 
to govern its relationship with A. Where matters such as standards of conduct and possible 
sanctions for failing to attain those standards have been committed to writing by one party, 
it will tend to show in favour of the relationship being one of employment. This 
consideration links in with the issue discussed above of “contracts of adherence”; while 
disciplinary policies are almost ubiquitous for employees of medium size and large firms, 
they are a relative rarity as addenda to commercial contracts. Codes of conduct and dress 
codes are, of course, not the exclusive preserve of employment relationships; a golf club 
may, for example, have written guidelines as to standards of dress and behaviour, and 
retain the right to expel or exclude members for breach of those standards. The mere 
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existence of a disciplinary policy will therefore never be determinative in and of itself of 
status, but it is a further factor that anybody should have regard to in assessing status.  
 
The final sub-paragraph directs a tribunal to have regard to any other relevant. This is a 
catch-all, to prevent the scope of the inquiry being artificially narrowed by overly-
prescriptive statutory draftsmanship.  
 
 
4.4.2.2: “CLEAR EXPECTATION” OF PERSONAL PERFORMANCE 
 
The deciding factor in the Deliveroo case was that the CAC found the riders’ right of 
substitution to have been genuine, absolute and unfettered.
186
 The panel did however 
remark that this feature had “puzzled [them] considerably”.187 In order to subcontract any 
particular task, the rider would have to trust the person to whom he was substituting both 
with her mobile phone and with the equipment she had leased from the company. Further, 
it was not clear to the CAC why this right either existed or was used: it could not identify 
any particular incentive to substitute either on the part of the rider or the person to whom 
she was substituting. It would not make sense for the substituter to take a percentage of the 
fee paid to the substitutee, because the substitutee could increase their fee by simply 
contracting with Deliveroo directly. Even if they did, each individual can only engage with 
the company once, so there are no economies of scale which can be taken advantage of. It 
also made little sense to the company, insofar as it would make “a mockery of the 
extensive training given to riders”.188 The existence of this curious right however was 
sufficient to score a technical victory for the company. The riders were therefore held to be 
self-employed and not workers. 
 
The outcome was arguably correct under the law as it stands.
189
 The personal service 
requirement has existed in the definition of a contract of employment since the Ready Mix 
Concrete.
190
 This does not however make it sacrosanct. By permitting the mere existence 
of this right to be determinative of the riders’ status, regardless of how widely it was 
known about or how infrequently it would or could be used, the court failed to take 
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account of the reality of their relationship with the company. The riders were not self-
employed in any meaningful sense of the words: they wore the uniforms of the company 
and subscribed to the company’s rule book; they could not negotiate with either customers 
or with the company over the fee for any particular task; and they could not offer 
customers or the company special deals to incentivise trade (for example, discounts on a 
particular day of the week or free delivery where the customer has had to wait a certain 
length of time). The sole means by which an individual rider could increase her salary was 
by working longer hours. In all the circumstances, the entrepreneurial freedom of the riders 
was restricted by the company. Indeed, the only feature consistent with self-employment 
was the riders’ little known ability to sub-contract. The personal performance requirement 
allowed all other factors indicating a working relationship to be overruled.  
 
Since the CAC’s decision in Deliveroo, the issue of personal performance has come before 
the Supreme Court in Pimlico Plumbers and Another v Smith.
191
 Giving the leading 
judgment, Lord Wilson affirmed that the “sole test is, of course, the obligation of personal 
performance; any other so-called sole test would be an inappropriate usurpation of the sole 
test.”192 The judgment does however go on to suggest that in certain cases “it might be 
helpful to assess the significance of [a purported worker’s] right to substitute […] by 
reference to whether the dominant feature of the contract remained personal performance 
on [the purported worker’s] part.”193 The personal performance requirement therefore 
remains absolute, although it may, on occasion, be assessed in light of this “dominant 
feature” consideration. At the time of writing, the Supreme Court’s decision in Pimlico is 
very recent. The effect (if any) the “dominant feature” consideration will have on decisions 
at first instance is unclear. At one extreme, tribunals may take the view that the 
consideration will always be trumped by the requirement for personal performance (the 
“sole test”); at the other, tribunals may regard such authoritative approval for the 
“dominant feature” consideration as grounds to treat a substitution clause as a mere 
contractual right available to a worker rather than being descriptive of the basis of the 
parties’ relationship. 
 
The spirit (if not the substance) of the decision in Pimlico is in keeping with the Supreme 
Court’s earlier decision in Autoclenz, in that it exhibits a willingness to single out terms 
contained within contracts of employment (or of service) as distinct cases within the law of 
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voluntary obligations where the strict formalism of contract is not as robustly enforced. 
Such decisions help widen the net of employment protections, as it allows a more fluid 
approach to be taken in determining whether an individual falls within the definition of a 
worker or employee within the terms of s.280, ERA and closes drafting loopholes which 
allow businesses to achieve technical knock outs; however it is argued, as it has been 
throughout this essay, that the “dominant feature” consideration will be of limited import 
provided the sole qualifying criterion for statutory employment protection remains rooted 
in contract. Personal performance is, of course, fundamental to the employment 
relationship. Any statutory test should retain this principle at its core however should also 
seek to build in sufficient flexibility in order to prevent employers seeking to score a 
technical knock-out. 
 
It is therefore suggested that the personal performance requirement as an absolute be 
replaced with a requirement that there be a “clear expectation” of personal performance. 
This test is contained within the second paragraph of the subsection listing factors relevant 
to the assessment of employee status. This maintains the personal service consideration, 
but deprives employers of the facility to use it as the sole ground for removing an 
individual from the statutory protections. The CAC in Deliveroo were able to identify that 
there was a clear expectation of personal service, through features such as the provision of 
training and the screening of candidates; and the fact it made little sense for either side for 
the rider to sub-contract assignments. Had the test required the court to find a clear 
expectation of personal service rather than an absolute requirement, the case would likely 
have been determined differently. “Clear expectation” was preferred to “reasonable 
expectation” however in order to preserve and reflect the centrality of personal service to 
the employment relationship. It should be read in conjunction with the words “A […] has 
carried out” in the previous subsection: the basic requirement of the status is that A has 
provided personal service throughout the duration of her employment relationship with B. 
A clear (as opposed to a reasonable) expectation means that it would only be in highly 
unusual or highly irregular circumstances that A did not carry out the work herself. So, 
while an individual may contract with a glazier to replace a window pane in her home, she 
may reasonably expect that the individual with whom she contracted would carry out the 
work, it is not a clear expectation. If a third person were to actually replace the pane, this 
would not be irregular to the contract, in spite of the contracting individual’s reasonable 
expectation as to the identity of the person who would carry out the work. The individual 
and the glazier are therefore not an employment relationship; the glazier is an independent 
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contractor. Therefore even if the glazier with whom the individual contracted had carried 
out the work herself, that would not affect her status as an independent contractor, insofar 
as she would be unable to demonstrate a clear expectation. 
 
The burden of proof in this limb of the test is neutral. The tribunal should have regard to all 
the factors before reaching a determination of whether there was a clear expectation of 
personal service.  
 
 
4.4.2.3: “ENTREPRENEURIAL FREEDOM” 
 
The third paragraph requires regard to be had, in the assessment of whether a relationship 
truly is one of employment, to the degree of entrepreneurial or creative freedom the 
individual contracting has. Entrepreneurial freedom should not be assessed solely within 
the narrow confines of the relationship the worker has with her purported employer. It 
should instead be considered with broader reference to both industry practices and the 
individual’s portfolio of potential economic interactions. In the case of a barrister, for 
example, she may have limited entrepreneurial freedom within the confines of an 
individual instruction from a law firm: the firm will likely agree a fee with the barrister’s 
clerk and will often give detailed and fairly rigid instructions of what they would like the 
barrister to do and how they would like her to do it. However, in the context of the 
barrister’s broader professional landscape, there are a number of ways that she has licence 
to manage her affairs: she may specialise in an area of law that is under catered for; she 
may market herself through speaking engagements and training events targeting law firms 
operating within her specialism; she may seek out additional qualifications. By viewing her 
entrepreneurial freedom in this context, it is obvious that she is meaningfully self-
employed. 
 
The entrepreneurial freedom test is more nuanced than the current “control” test, which is 
all but disapplied for jobs requiring any degree of skill:
194
 a brain surgeon, for example, 
will not be instructed on how to operate by the hospital manager. The new test will allow 
tribunals to look beyond the mere operational freedom the individual has and instead place 
his relationship with the purported employer in a broader economic context. It should also 
produce fairer outcomes for two reasons. The first is that only individuals who truly seek 
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out self-employment in order to obtain its benefits (whether financial, personal or creative) 
will forfeit the protections of employment law. Individuals who are currently classified as 
self-employed because that was the only form of arrangements offered to them by their 
purported employers but who do not have the ability to increase their salaries or operate 
with any degree of autonomy, will not. The second is that it will only create employer 
obligations in respect of firms who benefit from uniformity of performance. This is fair 
because under the current law such firms may benefit from the individuals’ lack of 
entrepreneurial freedom without having to incur any of the obligations incumbent upon 
employers. Deliveroo for example benefits from the ubiquity of its branding. Brand 
identity is created (among other things) by their riders wearing the uniform bearing the 
Deliveroo logo. The riders are marketed as being unquestionably “Deliveroo” riders,195 
rather than as being independent, self-employed businessmen operating within a market 
place. 
 
 
4.4.2.4: THE EMPLOYER-FACING ELEMENT 
 
A curious yet largely-uncommented-upon feature of the current test for employment status 
is this: despite the fact that the test concerns the identification of bilateral contract, the 
focus of consideration is almost exclusively upon one party to the contract; that is, upon 
the activities, rights and contractual freedoms of the employee or worker. There is little 
consideration, both in the common law or its attendant academic literature, to identifying a 
contract of employment by reference to the employer and its business.
196
 This has the 
potential to distort the test. 
 
One theme which this essay has sought to develop is the apportionment of economic and 
financial risk between interested parties in any business venture. I have argued that this 
apportionment is, in and of itself, policy neutral: the law should not prevent individuals 
from assuming greater risk in return for greater potential reward. Consider the 
commissioned salesperson: she may receive a modest basic salary but anticipates that a 
greater portion of her income will be made up by commission on sales. The employer 
enters into this bargain knowing that it may end up paying the employee more than it 
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would if it paid the individual a flat salary. It does so however both because such an 
arrangement limits the employer’s exposure in the event its business is unsuccessful or 
experiences a downturn, and in order to obtain the productivity dividend of incentivised 
work. The arrangement is mutually beneficial and there is no moral or political mandate 
for the law to intervene. 
 
However, this policy neutrality falls away where additional risk has been assumed by the 
worker with little or no corresponding increase in her potential rewards. I will refer to this 
as “unilateral risk assumption”. Contrast the case of the salesperson with, say, a retail 
worker working on a zero hours’ contract. The retail worker has no entitlement to a 
minimum amount of work; where her employer’s business experiences a downturn, it will 
mitigate the impact by cutting the amount work it pays her to do. The business’ losses are 
therefore passed onto the worker. Much like the salesperson, she has assumed a greater 
risk. However, unlike the salesperson, this risk is not traded off for potential reward: if the 
business is successful it will not share the profits with its staff. They will simply increase 
the number of hours the individual works, but her salary will remain capped at an hourly 
rate regardless of the success of the business. Again, while it is not suggested that 
employers should be forced to share their profits with their employees, what has happened 
in this instance is that the employer has passed the risk onto his employee simply because 
it can. This is particularly the case where such a reapportionment has arisen in 
consequence of the worker’s weakened bargaining power when contracting with her 
employer. In circumstances such as these, the behaviour of the company may be regarded 
as predatory; taking advantage of the worker’s need to earn a living and her limited 
vocational options. 
 
The law in such circumstances should step in to protect the weaker party in order to 
prevent a “doubling down” of such inequity (that is, that the worker’s limited bargaining 
power will not only result in her being less able to negotiate favourable contractual terms, 
but she will also miss out on some or all of the statutory protections available to 
employees). This should also be considered in respect of the near ubiquity of employer-
drafted terms and conditions (see above section on Contracts of Adhesion): where the 
terms and conditions contained within contracts of employment are offered to individuals 
on a take-it-or-leave it basis, both the means and the motive are present for the employer to 
engineer situations where individuals will be deprived of employee status. By failing to 
build any employer-facing considerations into the current test for status, the law has failed 
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in one important area to address this practice. Applying the current test to the above 
example of the retail worker, it is likely she would not qualify for employee status given 
the lack of mutual obligations between the parties.  
 
It is therefore proposed that the current worker-specific focus will be replaced in the 
statutory test with a two-way approach that requires the allocation of economic risk in the 
relationship to be assessed in light of the reality of both the duties and functions of the 
employee, and the nature of the employer’s undertaking. This will require the tribunal to 
have regard to the “nature of B’s business”. Such a test will essentially require the tribunal 
to have regard to the nature of the purported employer’s business with reference not only 
to its relationship with the worker but to broader industrial norms. A key element of this 
will be for the tribunal to assess the risk/reward paradigm both as it is and as it ought to be. 
The purpose of this exercise is neither to re-write elements of workers’ contracts nor to 
make any value judgements as to how risk and reward have been apportioned between the 
parties, but to gain a greater understanding of the nature of the relationship and, in 
consequence, whether the worker has assumed risks entirely voluntarily or not. Aspects 
both of the employer’s business and of the industry it operates in will need to be 
considered.  
 
There are a number of difficulties with this proposed model. The first is that rewards may 
not always be readily quantifiable in monetary terms. An individual may consider greater 
flexibility as to the hours she works or increased autonomy as to how, when and where she 
completes tasks to be rewards in-and-of themselves. A greater assumption of risk (that is, 
the loss of a guaranteed minimum amount of work) may therefore have been the result of a 
free and informed trade off for rewards which cannot be reduced to simple pounds and 
pence values. This problem is not easily resolved although it is anticipated that there is 
sufficient flexibility contained within the drafting. 
 
The second is evidential. The employer will doubtless be better placed than the employee 
to furnish the employment tribunal with details of the industry in which it operates. This 
may create a disadvantage for the employee insofar as she might struggle to find ways to 
prove or argue what industry norms are. By providing a neutral burden for this, the tribunal 
will be entitled to take a more inquisitorial approach to determining this issue. 
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4.4.3: CONSEQUENTIAL AMENDMENTS 
4.4.3.1: EXPANDING THE DEFINITION OF DISMISSAL 
 
Discussed above was the difficulty posed by removing the contractual test for status when 
considering whether or not an individual had been dismissed. This is in consequence of all 
three definitions of dismissals in the ERA all relating back to the contract of employment; 
these currently are where “: 
 
(a) the contract under which he is employed is terminated by the employer, 
(b) he is employed under a limited-term contract and that contract terminates by virtue 
of the limiting event without being renewed under the same contract, or 
(c) the employee terminated the contract under which he is employed […] in 
circumstances in which he is entitled to terminate it without notice by reason of the 
employer’s conduct.”197 
 
Under the proposed scheme, I would recommend two changes. The first is to replace the 
words “the contract under which he is employed” to “his employment” in s.95(1)(c) and 
s.136(1)(c). This kind of dismissal is often referred to colloquially as “constructive 
dismissal”. It is not anticipated that this amendment will affect the operation of this ground 
of dismissal. The second is that the definition of “dismissal” include the additional ground 
at s.95(1)(cc) and s.136(1)(cc) of “: 
 
(cc) the employee stops working for the employer for the sole or main reason that the 
employer stopped providing the employee with the amount of work the employee 
reasonably expected to have been given.” 
 
There are three elements to this dismissal. The first is that the employee had a reasonable 
expectation to a certain amount of work. Considered above was the case of Stevedoring, 
where the Court of Appeal held that a tribunal was wrong to have constructed a term of a 
contract of employment which obliged the employer to offer workers “a reasonable amount 
of casual work”.198 Under this method however that is precisely what courts will be asked 
to do (thus overruling Stevedoring by statute insofar as it applies to the employment 
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relationship). It is also anticipated that these kinds of dismissals will be available not just to 
zero hours employees, but also to employees with contracts of employment providing for 
an artificially low amount of work. For example, where an individual works under a 
contract of employment providing a minimum for 5 hours per week, but where the 
employee habitually works overtime bringing her hours of work in line with full time 
employment. Under the current law, if the employer experiences a downturn, it can reduce 
her hours down to the minimum of five without terminating her contract. Under the 
proposed statutory test, this can amount to a dismissal, provided the employee stops 
working. In the case of workers with hours or amounts of work fixed by agreement or by 
contract, the determination of the reasonable expectation ought to be quite straightforward. 
The case of zero hours workers will be more difficult. This will require the tribunal to 
undertake a degree of factual inquiry in order to determine the amount of work that should 
have been given. 
 
The concept of a “reasonable expectation” of an amount of work will provide tribunals 
with flexibility in determining whether or what work should have been given. This 
flexibility is greater than, say, the calculation of a week’s pay for the purposes of 
remunerating employees taking maternity leave, which prescribes a rigid averaging out of 
salary over a 12 week reference period.
199
 This flexibility will allow tribunal to consider a 
wider time periods where relevant. Consider for example a maintenance engineer at a 
hotel. The hotel is only open between April and October and is closed between November 
and March. She is engaged at the start of the season on a zero hours’ contract and works on 
average 35 hours every week during the season. At the conclusion of the season, the 
employer does not give the employee any further work. She has not been dismissed for the 
purposes of this paragraph (although she may have been working under a contract which 
terminated by expiration), as she cannot have had a reasonable expectation to be have been 
given work during this period. When the on-season recommences the following April 
however the employee may reasonably expect to be given work on similar terms to what 
she had worked the previous year. If the employer does not provide her with work the 
following year, she may consider herself dismissed and seek a redundancy pay.  
 
The second element is that the employer stops providing the employee with an amount of 
work that she had reasonably expected. There are two features of this element attracting 
comment. This first feature is that it is not an absolute concept (that is, that the employer 
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stops providing the employee with a reasonable amount of work rather than with any 
work). The reason for this is to provide employees with a potential remedy where the 
volume of their work (and in consequence, their earnings) has been substantially and 
unilaterally reduced by an employer. An absolute requirement would also have allowed 
employers to avoid the risk of dismissal by simply providing employees with a minimal 
amount of work. 
 
The second feature is that there is no reasonableness qualification on this aspect of the test. 
Reasonableness is only relevant to the employee’s expectation of the volume of work. 
There is no consideration given to the reasonableness of the employer’s decision not to 
give work. It may be possible therefore for an employer to reduce an employee’s hours of 
work to an unreasonable amount (meaning that she was dismissed for the purposes of this 
subsection), but to have done so in a way that is reasonable (meaning that she was not 
unfairly dismissed for the purposes of Part X, ERA). This employee would likely be 
entitled to a redundancy payment. 
 
The third element is that the employee stops working. On some occasions, the employee 
will have no choice by to stop working (that is, where the employer has stopped providing 
her with work altogether). The sole or main reason for her having stopped working will 
have been because there was no work offered to her. It therefore fits within this definition 
of dismissal. However, where an employee’s work has been reduced (consider the example 
given above of the individual with 5 contractual hours who habitually works in excess of 
this amount), positive action will be required on the part of the employee to refuse the offer 
of a reduced amount of work. In such cases, the determination of the “sole or main reason” 
for her stopping working will be a simple matter of fact to be determined on the civil 
standard of proof. The existence of this elective element for dismissal makes a species of 
the genus “constructive dismissal”. This element is necessary as, without it, employees 
whose volume of work had been reduced to a minimum would be entitled to claim a 
redundancy payment while still working for the employer. Conceivably, this could occur 
every time the employee experiences a reduction in her hours of work. This element 
provides employees with a choice while not allowing them to obtain a windfall.  
 
One issue that may arise is a situation where an employer reduces an employee’s hours and 
she continues working for a period of time before stopping work and claiming that she 
either is entitled to a redundancy payment or has been unfairly dismissed. This may be 
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perceived as having the potential to disadvantage the employer insofar as there is no set 
limit on the length of time an employee is required to stop working after she has 
discovered that her employer is not providing her with a reasonable amount of work. There 
are two mechanisms within the provision which guard against this. The first is the 
“reasonable expectation” requirement: the longer the employee continues to work with her 
reduced workload, the less able she will be to establish that she reasonably expected to 
have been given more hours. This will provide employees a small window following the 
reduction in their workload to consider (in the hope that their workload will pick up again) 
whether or not they which to stop working and claim redundancy, while not providing 
them with an indefinite period in which they may wish to stop working altogether. The 
second is the “sole or main reason” test. Again, the more time that passes, the more 
difficult it will be for the employee to establish through evidence that the sole or main 
reason for her stopping work is the fact that her workload has been reduced. 
 
The test is broad enough to encompass any employer initiated termination, in a similar way 
to the manner in which s.95(1)(a) operates for individuals employed under contract of 
employment. Where an employer terminates the employment of an employee working in 
the gig economy on the grounds of (say) conduct, a necessary corollary of this termination 
is that the employer will stop giving the employee work. Assuming the other two elements 
can be made out (reasonable expectation and cessation of work) then this ground will be 
sufficient to enable the gig worker to claim unfair dismissal regardless of the purportedly 
fair reason for dismissal. Of course, this will create an additional hurdle for workers not 
employed on contracts of employment, insofar as they will be required to surmount the 
“reasonable expectation” requirement. However, as this is purely a factual matter for the 
tribunal to decide, it is submitted that this requirement is less onerous than what the 
employee would otherwise be required to do, which is demonstrate that she was employed 
under a contract of employment.  
 
The codification of a statutory test for dismissal in circumstances where an individual has 
either no, or a misleadingly small, contractual entitlement to a minimum amount of work is 
challenging. The reason for this is that the statutory concept of dismissal under the current 
law is bound up with the contract of employment. In the case of the former, the contract of 
employment (assuming one exists) will not be breached by simply providing the employee 
with no work; in the case of the latter, the amount of work the employee does can be 
reduced to the contractual minimum, causing the individual to suffer a reduction in their 
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wages. I have sought to solve this by first creating an entitlement to expect a certain 
amount of work and second by providing for circumstances under which an employee may 
consider themselves to have been dismissed. The individuals will then receive a 
redundancy pay. While this form of dismissal will widen the scope of individuals who 
benefit from the end-of-employment protections contained within the ERA, it will go no 
further than to bring the rights of many gig economy workers into line with those of 
individuals working under traditional contracts of employment. The rights not to be 
unfairly dismissed and to receive a redundancy payment are subject to a minimum service 
qualification, which should protect employers from pernicious or vexatious claims from 
employees who have only worked a number of shifts. In the example of the seasonal hotel 
worker, given above, she will need to have worked two full seasons before she is entitled 
to a redundancy payment; it will only be upon seeking work during the third that she will 
be receive any form of recompense. I have sought to create balance by including the 
requirement that the employee will have to cease working. This will prevent employees 
from seeking to obtain a windfall by claiming a redundancy payment while still working. 
This additional ground of dismissal, read in conjunction with the decontractualised test for 
employment status, should bring the rights of gig economy workers in line with those of 
individuals who work under traditional contracts of employment. As identified, the test 
contains a number of elements.  
 
In the previous chapter, I argued inter alia that the current contract-dependent test for 
employment status led to many gig economy workers being deprived of employment rights 
enjoyed by individuals working under traditional contracts of employment. In this chapter, 
I have suggested a solution to this problem by creating a new test for status and an 
additional ground to the definition of dismissal. There are three consequent amendments to 
other provisions with the ERA which require consideration. This will be the focus of the 
following sections. These are amendments to the provisions relating to determining an 
employee’s effective date of termination, the test for unfair dismissal and calculating an 
employee’s period of continuous service. In addition, I will also consider the issue of 
implied terms and constructive dismissal, and an amendment to reg.4 of TUPE. 
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4.4.3.2: EFFECTIVE DATE OF TERMINATION 
 
The effective date of termination (“EDT”) is relevant for the purpose of determining the 
length of time for which certain statutory rights of action exist; a claim for unfair dismissal, 
for example, must be presented to the employment tribunal no less than 3 months from the 
EDT.
200
 It is also relevant both for the enforcement of statutory rights that require a 
minimum qualifying service provision
201
 and for the calculation of compensation for 
awards for which length of continuous service is a factor.
202
  For any of the existing 
grounds of dismissal, the mathematics of the calculation will relatively straightforward 
(although the factual reality of what was said to whom and when may not be). The 
distinction between these kinds of dismissals and the proposed additional ground of 
dismissal is that the additional ground requires a concurrence of two events; that is, that the 
employer stops giving the employee a reasonable amount of work and that the employee 
stops working altogether. This presents a difficulty. A purely respondent focused test (that 
is, the date when the employer stops providing a reasonable amount of work) has the 
potential to disadvantage employees in cases where they may not be aware that the 
employer has stopped providing work. It may also lead to an unsatisfactory outcome, as the 
employee may continue to work for his employer for some period of time following the 
cessation of the provision of a reasonable amount of work, meaning the effective date of 
termination will occur some time before the dismissal has any legal effect. Consider the 
above example of the worker with a contract for five hours per week who in fact habitually 
works full time hours. If the employer stops giving her a reasonable amount of work (that 
is, full time hours) on week one, she may continue to work until week four before deciding 
to stop working and sue for a redundancy payment. Her dismissal will only have effect in 
terms of s.136(1)(cc) on week four however her effective date of termination will be week 
one. 
 
An exclusively employee-focused test (that is, the date the employee last works) creates 
similar problems for the employee. Consider the above example of the hotel maintenance 
engineer. If she shows up for work at the start of the new hotel season in April to find that 
her employer will not provide her with any work that season, then her effective date of 
termination will have been in November. She will have lost her right to claim both unfair 
                                                 
200
 s.111, ERA, subject to the  
201
 For example, the right not to be unfairly dismissed 
202
 For example, the value of a redundancy payment 
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dismissal and a redundancy payment. For these reasons, I have opted for the following 
approach: 
 
97(1) Subject to the following provisions of this section, in this part “the effective date of 
termination”-  
 
[...] 
 
(cc) In relation to an employee whose employment is terminated by operation of 
s.95(1)(cc) or s.136(1)(cc), means the first date on which: 
(i) the employee is aware, or reasonably ought to been aware, that his 
employer had stopped providing him with a reasonable amount of 
work; and 
(ii) the employee does not work. 
 
 
This definition seeks to combine both elements of the additional ground of dismissal. The 
potential time bar issue caused by the employee-focused test has been alleviated by making 
the cessation of a provision of work employee subjective; that is, it will focus on when the 
employee first gained the knowledge that her employer would no longer provide her with a 
minimum amount of work. This is qualified by the condition of there being a day when she 
“reasonably ought” to have been aware. The second limb prevents the effective date of 
termination falling some time after the employee has gained this knowledge.  
 
In the example of the hotel maintenance engineer, her EDT will depend on when she first 
discovered that there was going to be no work for her in the new season: if the employer 
had told her at the conclusion of the previous season that it would not be requiring her 
services the following season (or if she ought reasonably to have been aware of this at the 
close of the season; for example, if the hotel was being demolished), then her EDT would 
be the day following her final shift. If she was not told at the conclusion of one season that 
she would not be required back for the next (or if there were no facts or circumstances 
from which she could reasonably have worked it out herself), then her EDT would be the 
day she discovered that she was not required that season. 
 
64 
 
In drafting this provision, I have sought to reconcile the difficulties caused by the 
imprecise nature of employees being employed without any contractual guarantee of a 
minimum amount of work. Often changes in statute can be used to drive social change; 
while some employers are using the current contractual rigidities of employment law to 
deprive individuals of employment rights, it is hoped that by reversing this burden and 
allowing a more flexible approach not only to who qualifies for employment rights but also 
when and how they can be enforced, employers will seek a degree of financial certainty by 
employing individuals on full and obvious contracts of employment. 
 
 
4.4.3.3: UNFAIR DIMISSAL 
 
The test for unfair dismissal is contained in s.98, ERA. Broadly speaking, the test requires 
a tribunal to adopt a two-stage approach. The first stage places the burden of proof upon 
the employer to show that the reason for dismissal was either one falling into the 
potentially fair reasons listed in s.98(2), ERA, or was for some other substantial reason of a 
kind which would justify dismissal.
203
 The second stage has a neutral burden which 
requires the tribunal to determine whether or not the employer acted reasonably in all the 
circumstances, including having regard to various prescribed factors such as the size and 
administrative resources of the employer’s undertaking.204 Each potentially fair reason has 
its own common law idiosyncrasies which have developed through the case law.
205
 The 
operation of the two-stage test should remain largely unaffected by the change to the 
definition of dismissal proposed in the above section, however it is suggested that for the 
sake of clarity the following subsection is added into s.98:  
 
“(6A) Where an employee is dismissed by operation of s.95(1)(cc) or s.136(1)(cc), the 
reason for dismissal for the purposes of this section will be the reason the employer 
stopped providing the employee with the amount of work the employee reasonably 
expected to be given.” 
 
This section simply seeks to guide the tribunal as to where the burden of proof contained in 
s.94(1) lies and how it will be discharged. Under the current law, where, say, an Uber 
                                                 
203
 s.98(1), ERA 
204
 s.98(4), ERA 
205
 See, for example, British Home Stores v Burchell [1973] ICR 303 relating to the test to be applied where 
the reason for dismissal relates to the conduct of the employee in terms of s.98(2)(a), ERA 
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driver has been the subject of an allegation by a customer, it is open to the company to 
deactivate her account without any investigation, regardless of how long the individual has 
driven for the company. This places her at a substantial disadvantage when compared to 
individuals employed under contracts of employment. In the case of an individual 
employed under a contract of employment, the employer will be required to carry out a 
reasonable investigation and follow a procedure in line with the relevant codes of 
practice.
206
 Under the proposed change, where the Uber driver’s account has been 
deactivated, her employer will have stopped providing her with the amount of work she 
reasonably expected to have been given. She will not work for the company. She therefore 
may claim that her right not to be unfairly dismissed has been breached. In order to dismiss 
fairly, the employer, by operation of s.94(6A) is required to demonstrate both that it had a 
potentially fair reason  for reducing the amount of work it was giving her and that it carried 
out a fair and reasonable procedure before making that reduction. In this example, the 
reason the employer stopped providing the employee with the amount of work she had 
reasonably expected related to her conduct (insofar as it had received an allegation). Had it 
carried out an investigation, perhaps by taking a statement from the customer and allowing 
the employee to put forward her case, whether in defence or mitigation of the charge; and 
then by convening a disciplinary hearing in order to consider the outcome of the 
investigation, the employee may have been fairly dismissed. 
 
 
4.4.3.4: CONTINUITY OF EMPLOYMENT 
 
In consequence of the de-contractualisation of the test for employee status, adjustment is 
required to the statutory definition of continuous employment,
207
 which provides that an 
individual will be taken to be in continuous employment for “any week during the whole 
or part of which an employee’s relations are governed by a contract of employment.”208 As 
it is anticipated that many individuals will continue to be employed under contracts of 
employment (and that, for the most part, the written records of those contracts will be a fair 
and honest reflection of the intention and understanding of the parties at the point of 
contracting), this portion of the test ought to remain. This test however will not be 
appropriate for assessing the continuity of service of individuals who are in employment 
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 See the ACAS Code of Practice on Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures 
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 Found at Chapter I, Part XIV, ERA 
208
 s.212(1), ERA 
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but do not work under a contract of employment. As this essay has argued that the 
definition of employment should be expanded so as not to exclude workers in atypical 
relationships (including seasonal workers), should the definition be changed to “any week 
where the employee is in employment”, would have the possibility to exclude certain kinds 
of workers who do not work every week. 
 
The period of continuous employment is superficially defined at s.211(1), ERA as lasting 
from “the day on which the employee starts work, and […] ends with the day the 
employee’s period of continuous employment is to be ascertained”. The first limb of this 
test (with remarkable prescience for the purposes of this essay) ignores the contractual 
dimension altogether and ordains the day the employee actually starts working as the 
beginning of her period of continuous service. For obvious reasons, I do not propose 
interfering with this limb of the definition. 
 
The second limb of the definition can only be understood when read in conjunction with 
s.212(1), ERA, which provides that “any week during […] which the employee’s relations 
with his employer are governed by a contract of employment counts in computing the 
employee’s period of employment”. The difficulty provided by this limb for the proposed 
status test, of course, stems from the reference to the contract of employment. The 
proposed solution is to use the concept of the “employment relationship” from the status 
test in place of the contract of employment. The proposed version of s.212(1) will therefore 
substitute the words “the employee’s relations are governed by a contract of employment” 
with “the employee is in an employment relationship with the employer”.  
 
On the face of it, this definition may prove problematic for employees working in atypical 
patterns: for example, the hotel maintenance engineer will not work during the off season. 
During the off-season, she might not satisfy the definition of an “employee” for the 
purposes of the proposed statutory test. The answer however is contained (again, with 
remarkable prescience) within both s.212(3)(b) and (c), ERA, which excludes from the 
definition of continuous service “any week during […] which an employee is […] absent 
from work on account of a temporary cessation of work” and “absent from work in 
circumstances that, by arrangement or custom, he is regarded as continuing in the 
employment of his employer for any purpose”. These two paragraphs should provide 
statutory mechanisms by which the gap in continuous employment for atypical workers 
could be bridged. In the example of the hotel maintenance engineer, both provisions are 
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applicable: the off-season can be properly regarded both as a temporary cessation of work 
and an arrangement where no work was expected of the employee. 
 
 
4.4.3.5: IMPLIED TERMS AND CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL 
 
The proposed test for employee status removes the existence of a contract of employment 
as an absolute prerequisite of status. Contracts of employment, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, are given special treatment not only by statute but also at common law, insofar as 
the common law implies certain terms onto contracts of employment which are not (as a 
rule) implied into other contracts. The significance of these implied terms largely relates to 
the manner in which they are founded upon by individuals claiming they have been 
unfairly constructively dismissed. 
 
Despite having a statutory right of action,
209
 constructive dismissal is largely a contractual 
matter. In order to claim constructive dismissal, an employee is required to demonstrate 
that they had terminated their contract of employment in circumstances where they were 
entitled to do so by reason of their employer’s conduct. The employee is required to satisfy 
a four-step test in order to successfully demonstrate that she has been dismissed. The first 
is that the employer breached a term of her contract; the second is that the breach was 
sufficiently serious so as to repudiate the contract; the third is that she resigned in response 
to the breach and not for some other, unconnected reason; and the fourth is that she 
delayed unduly before taking the decision to terminate her contract.  
 
I proposed above that the test for employee-initiated dismissal be changed in order to 
require an employee to terminate their employment, rather than their contract of 
employment. The four-stage test for s.95(1)(c) dismissals has been taken from the common 
law and has no statutory basis. It is submitted that the principles and spirit of this test can 
still apply to s.95(1)(c) dismissals even in the absence of a contract of employment. 
However, in order to do so, the rights which the employer is alleged to have breached may 
have to be created, as employees in certain circumstances will not be able to rely on a 
contract of employment as the source of those rights. The solution is simply to insert a new 
section into the ERA which replicates the implied terms. So, for example, where an 
employer in the gig economy acts towards an employee in a way that destroys or seriously 
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damages the relationship of trust and confidence, it will breach its duty owed to that 
employee under statute. Provided the breach is sufficiently serious, the employee will be 
entitled to resign in response to the breach and claim that she has been constructively 
dismissed.  
 
There are therefore two proposed amendments to the ERA required in order to bring the 
rights of gig workers in line with those employed under contracts of employment. The first 
is the above-mentioned new section codifying the rights implied at common law onto the 
contract of employment. The second is to add the following subsection onto s.95 giving 
statutory effect to the test for constructive dismissal at s.95(2A). 
 
95(2A) For the purposes of s.95(1)(c), an employee will be entitled to terminate his 
contract by reason of his employers conduct where: 
(a) the employer has breached any employment right of the employee contained within 
this Act; 
(b) that breach was sufficiently serious so as to repudiate the employment 
relationship; 
(c) the employee terminated his employment in response to that breach and not for 
some other, unconnected reason; and 
(d) the employee has not unduly delayed before terminating his employment. 
 
 
4.4.4: REGULATION 4(4) TUPE VOIDING MECHANISM 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, TUPE will have limited or no application for gig 
economy workers. While the main focus of this essay has been in relation to rights 
contained within the ERA, TUPE itself contains limited rights of action and most claims 
brought pursuant to transgressions of the regulations are contained within the ERA. The 
expanded definition of employment given above should give effect to the prohibition of 
dismissals because of a transfer found at reg.7, TUPE. This does however still leave the 
issue of reg.4 and, in particular, the voiding mechanism which prevents a transferee from 
varying the terms and conditions of transferring employees. The current regulations only 
provide for the protection of terms contained within contracts of employment. It is 
proposed that the wording of reg.4 is amended to remove references to “contracts of 
employment” or “contract” and simply replace them with “employment”. So for example, 
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in reg.4(1), the words “a relevant transfer shall not operate so as to terminate the contract 
of employment of any person” will now read “a relevant transfer shall not operate so as to 
terminate the employment of any person”. Similarly, in reg.4(2), “all the transferor’s 
rights, powers, duties and liabilities under or in connection with any such contract” will 
read “all the transferor’s rights, powers, duties and liabilities under or in connection with 
any such employment”. 
 
The concept of employment as defined by the new proposed test is sufficiently broad so as 
to cover terms derived from contracts of employment. The amendment will therefore leave 
individuals currently employed under contracts of employment unaffected. The wording of 
reg.4(2) is already sufficiently broad so as to include the transfer of matters which are not 
strictly contractual; it provides that a number of matters “under or in connection with any 
such contract” will transfer. Therefore the amendment of this clause will not affect the 
substance or spirit of the application of TUPE. Where a worker in the gig economy is 
assigned to an organised grouping of resources which transfers, these proposed changes 
should operate to protect his ongoing terms and conditions of employment. So, for 
example, where an individual is employed by an app based employer to deliver food in a 
certain area, and that employer transfers that part of its business to another employer, any 
change the incoming employer makes to the rates at which the employee is paid for 
deliveries will be voided by operation of reg.4.  
 
 
4.5: CONCLUSION 
 
The true villain of this piece is the contractual gateway into statutory employment rights. 
Employers – in both the gig economy and elsewhere – simply act unthinkingly according 
to market forces. Corporate responsibility towards employees should never be presumed; 
on the contrary, corporate irresponsibility is precisely the reason employment laws exist in 
the first place. Where a loophole opens which allows employers to take advantage of 
regulatory arbitrage, Adam Smith’s invisible hand will invariably push businesses through 
it. This is no more than a structural function of capitalism. The role of policymakers is to 
be alert to the existence of such loopholes and to close them off as soon as this existence 
becomes known. In this endeavour, Taylor was a failure: the unwillingness to propose any 
alternative to the two-tier status will mean that a constituency of workers will inevitably 
remain outwith the security of the end-of-employment protections. Similarly, the principle 
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of Parliamentary sovereignty has restricted the Supreme Court’s role to that of mitigating 
rather than the resolving the problem. It has done so with an admirable degree of 
imagination, through cases such as Autoclenz and Pimlico, however it can never remove 
the contractual basis on its own. 
 
Despite precarious work being nothing new, the emergence of the gig economy and the 
dynamism of the gig business models have drawn the issue into the political mainstream. 
As gig employers find workable formulae across different industries, the number of 
workers gigging without guarantee of work or wage will increase further. Reform of the 
status tests is required to mitigate the social and personal impact of this increase. 
 
The solution argued for in this thesis is one which removes the contractual nexus from the 
statutory test. In so doing, it has suggested a codification of the common law principles 
used to identify a contract of employment into statute, updated to account for the realities 
of modern working practices (for example, by replacing “control” with “degree of 
entrepreneurial freedom”; and “mutuality of obligations” with a “reasonable expectation of 
work”). By putting these tests on a statutory basis, courts and tribunals will be able to 
determine status entirely without constraint by principles of contract law. It is not however 
offered as a panacea to all problems caused by the gig economy. Some problems may be 
countered by other areas of law, such as taxation or competition; others may be here to 
stay. In the previous chapter we considered how the physical and geographical realities of 
the digital allocation of work made it more difficult for workers to organise for purpose if 
collective action. While part of this will be offset by the ability of social media to create a 
virtual space for interaction, such organisation is not apt for statutory encouragement. It 
will likely have to occur organically across the virtual workplace. Bolstering legal 
protections should however embolden workers seeking to organise in these ways. 
 
Further consequential amendments may also be required to the proposed status test. For 
example, the proposal has the potential to establish an employment relationship between 
agency workers and the principals who have solicited their work from the agency. This 
may or may not be desirable, according to political taste. A simple express carve out could 
however remove liability for principals using agency staff: an inversion of the express 
inclusion of principals in s.41(5), EqA, for example, would achieve this. 
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Aspects of an individual’s working relationship are and will likely remain matters to be 
agreed voluntarily between employer and employee: wages, hours and place of work are 
free of statutory interference beyond the safety net provisions contained within the NMW 
and the WTR. Other aspects (such as the duty to pay wages in cash and the reason for 
termination) have been identified by parliament as matters which should be regulated. 
These are the involuntary obligations. The aim of this final chapter was to provide a 
mechanism for ensuring involuntary obligations upon employers remain truly involuntary, 
with a view to lifting everyone bar the genuinely and wilfully self-employed into the scope 
of employment protections. In this sense therefore, in spite of the leaps in technology 
required to create the smartphone economy, the fundamental policy goals have not 
deviated since the days of Beveridge in 1942. 
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s.230 Definition of Employee 
(1) A person, A, is an employee of another, B, where B has offered to provide, and A 
has agreed to carry out and has carried out, work in an employment relationship; 
 
(2) In determining the question of whether or not a relationship is an employment 
relationship for the purposes of subsection (1), regard shall be had to- 
 
(a) The terms of any document relating to the relationship between A and B, 
including:- 
(i)  The terms of any written agreement between A and B; 
(ii) The terms of any collective agreement between B and a Trade Union 
representing a bargaining unit of which A is a member; 
(iii) Any policies produced by B in order to govern its relationship with A; and 
(iv) Any other relevant document; 
 
(b) Whether or not there is a clear expectation that A will carry out the work 
personally; 
(c) The degree of entrepreneurial freedom A has as to the manner in which he 
carries out the work; 
(d) The nature of B’s business; 
(e) Any other relevant circumstances consistent with an employment relationship. 
 
(3) In considering any term contained within any document for the purposes of 
s.230(2)(a)(i), regard should be had to the relative bargaining power between A and 
B at the time the terms of those documents were either agreed, amended or came 
into force. 
 
(4) An employee is not an individual who is:- 
 
(a) employed by another person; and 
(b) supplied by that other person in furtherance of a contract to which 
the principal is a party 
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National Health Service (Scotland) Act 1978 
Sale of Goods Act 1979 
Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981 
Pregnant Workers’ Directive, Council Directive 92/85 
Wages Act 1986 
Insolvency Act 1986 
Directive on An Employer’s Obligation to Inform Employees of the Conditions Applicable 
to the Contract or Employment Relationship, Council Directive 91/533 
Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 
Commercial Agents (Council Directive) Regulations 1993 
Working Time Directive, Council Directive 93/104/EC 
Employment Rights Act 1996 
Working Time Regulations 1998 
Employment Relations Act 1999 
Maternity and Parental Leave etc. Regulations 1999 
Electric Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 
Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006 
Companies Act 2006 
Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 
Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009 
Employment Relations Act 1999 (Blacklists) Regulations 2010 
Equality Act 2010 
Collective Redundancies and Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) 
(Amendment) Regulations 2014 
Private Housing (Tenancies) (Scotland) Act 2016 
